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The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody
Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest
Equation
The paramount consideration in child custody disputes is the
"best interest" of the child. I Statutes providing for judicial determination of custody generally allow judges great discretion in deciding
what is in the child's best interest. Some statutes fail to provide the
judge with guidelines for exercising this discretion,2 while others list
factors that the judge must consider in determining the child's best
interest. 3 Only six statutes include religion as a factor to be considered in awarding custody.4 Many judges, however, factor religion
into their evaluation of the child's best interest. 5
This Note examines when judges deciding custody disputes may
consider potential custodians' religious practices without violating
the establishment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution. 6
I. Almost every custody opinion recites this rule. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sparks, 323
N.W.2d 264,266 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Park v. Park, 610 P.2d 826,827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980);
Note, Religion - A Factor In Awarding Custody of Infants?, S.C. L. REV. 313, 314 (1958),
2. See, e.g., CAL. [C1v.J CODE§ 4600 (West 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 12, § 1277 (West
1961 & Supp. 1983-1984).
3. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 40-4-212 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1983).
4. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46 {1976); MICH,
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 722.23 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 518.17 (West Supp.
1984); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 764.24 (West 1981).
5. See note 20 i'!fra and accompanying text.
6. The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST,
amend. I. This amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). It applies to judicial as well as legislative actions.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). The two religion clauses contained in the first
amendment, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, are separate but related
requirements which are at times in tension. The Court has stated that it
repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses . . . and that it may often not be possible to promote the former
without offending the latter. As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to
maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion.
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (double aspect of the first amendment both prevents legal compulsion
to accept any form of worship and safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion),
This Note examines the requirements of the establishment clause in the context of child custody disputes. See Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional·
Religion As a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981), for an analysis
of the free exercise clause in this context.
In the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, "the establishment clause was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and state."' Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3341 (1983)
(quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 16 (1947)). See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct,
1355, 1359 (1984). The clause was directed against three main evils: "sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)); see also
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Although courts agree that they may not prefer one parent to another for religious reasons when both parents are religious and
neither parent's religious practices threaten the child's health or
safety, some courts believe that they may constitutionally prefer a
religious parent to a nonreligious parent. Part I argues that courts
violate the establishment clause by preferring religion to nonreligion
when there is no showing that the child has personal religious con- .
victions. Part II distinguishes such cases from those involving a
child with a sincere preference for or against religion. 7 It concludes
that courts may constitutionally consider religion in custody disputes
over children with personal convictions about religion.
l.

CONSIDERING RELIGION WHEN THE CHILD HAS
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS

No

Courts deciding child custody cases consistently refuse to choose
between parents of different faiths on the basis of religion. 8 Under
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (the primary purpose of the first amendment is "to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres
of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid
or support for religion" (quoting Everson v. Board ef Educ., 330 U.S. at 32)); Kurland, The
Irrelevance ef the Constitution: The Religion Clauses ef the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 13 (1978) (same). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
while separation is the ideal, "[s]ome relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable." Lynch v. .Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1358 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. at 614). Thus, "[i]n every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable
tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the
state upon the other, and the reality that ... total separation of the two is not possible." 104
S. Ct. at 1358-59.
In addition to separation, a goal of the establishment clause is governmental neutrality
towards religion. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968), where the Supreme
Court explained that government "must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine and
practice. It may not be hostile to any religion, or to the advocacy of no-religion, and it may not
aid, foster, or promote one religion . . . against another . . . . The first amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and nonreligion." See also Lynch v. .Donnelly, 104 S.
Ct. at 1359 (Constitution "forbids hostility toward any" religion); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18
(states may neither handicap nor favor religions).
The establishment clause goals of separation and neutrality promote several important interests. First, they protect individual autonomy in making choices about religious matters. See
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Choper, The Estabishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 267 (1968); Sky, The Establishment
Clause, The Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1422-23
(1966). Second, separation and neutrality protect religious institutions from governmental interference. They also "prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an
attachment to the organs of government." Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962) ("[A] union of government and religion tends
to destroy government and to degrade religion."); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Finally, the separation and neutrality requirements "help assure that essentially religious issues, precisely because
of their importance and sensitivity, do not become the occasion for battle in the political
arena." Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. A sincere preference for no religion at all should be regarded as a sincere belief. See
notes 22, 81, 93, 96 i,!fra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So.2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); In re Marriage of
Urband, 68 Cal. App.3d 796, 798, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 433-34 (1977); Goodman v. Goodman,
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the establishment clause, 9 laws granting denominational preferences
are regarded as suspect and are subject to strict scrutiny. 10 They
may be justified only by a compelling governmental interest and
must be narrowly drawn to further that interest. 11 Thus, the establishment clause generally prohibits courts deciding custody disputes
from choosing between religious 12 parents on the grounds of religion. This rule applies even when one parent follows an unconventional or unpopular religion. 13
180 Neb. 83, 88, 141 N.W.2d 445,448 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super.
403, 404, 205 A.2d 49, 51 (1964); In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 619 P.2d 374,
382 (1980).
9. State action preferring one religion to another potentially violates both religion clauses
of the first amendment. When a court favors one parent over another for religious reasons,
this implicates the disfavored parent's right to the free exercise of her religion, In re Marriage
ofHadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566,619 P.2d 374,382 (1980), and the prohibition against the state
establishing a religion, Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 331 n.2 (Mo, 1978). This Note,
however, focuses on the issues raised by the establishment clause. See note 6 supra.
10. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct.
1355 (1984), where the Supreme Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to analyze the presence
of a publicly owned creche in the midst of a Christmas display in a park in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island. The Court did not reject strict scrutiny generally, stating that it was applicable to a
"statute or practice patently discriminatory on its face." However, the Court was "unable to
see this display, or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in
Larson." 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13. The Court of Appeals had viewed the city's ownership of the
$200 creche as a discrimination between Christian and other religions and had therefore subjected it to strict scrutiny. The dissent agreed with this approach, noting that the majority had
brushed "the point aside with little explanation." 104 S. Ct. at 1375 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Lynch majority appears to have been influenced by the fact that the monetary value
and upkeeping costs of the creche were minimal, and by their view of the creche as a passive
symbol adding little to the character of the Christmas celebration. The Court argued that the
"traditional, purely secular displays extant at Christmas, with or without the creche, would
inevitably recall the religious nature of the Holiday." It concluded that if including the creche
"violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas,
and most of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the Constitution." 104 S. Ct. at
1365. Given the peculiar facts of Lynch, it appears safe to conclude that 'in the child custody
context the Court would employ the strict scrutiny analysis generally applicable to denominational preference laws.
11. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982). In Larson, the Supreme Court considered
a Minnesota law giving certain preferences to religious organizations receiving "more than
half of their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations." 456 U.S. at 232.
The Court stated that the law granted denominational preferences "of the sort consistently and
firmly deprecated in our precedents." 456 U.S. at 246. Thus, it could only be justified if it
served a compelling governmental interest and was "closely fitted to further that interest." 456
U.S. at 247. The Court, assuming arguendo that the governmental interest served was compelling, found that the law was not narrowly tailored to this interest. 456 U.S. at 248-49.
12. This Note defines "religious" as courts generally do in child custody cases. The term
usually is used to refer to some formal observance of the practices of an organized religion.
Courts often consider church attendance and sending a child to Sunday school in deciding
whether or not a potential custodian's home is appropriately "religious." See, e.g., the cases
cited at notes 20, 28-32 i'!fra.
13. Courts generally agree that in most cases "the unconventionality or unpopularity of the
applicant's religion may not be considered in fixing custody." Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U. L. REV. 333, 366 (1955). For examples of courts awarding custody to
parents following unconventional and perhaps unpopular religions, see note 18 ,iffra.
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There is an exception to this rule, however, when one parent's
religious practices threaten the child's temporal health 14 or physical
safety. As the state has a compelling interest in protecting children, 15 the establishment clause does not bar the court from considering religion in such cases. 16 The court's inquiry into a parent's
religion, however, should be limited. The inquiry should focus on
the parent's religious practices. The court may also consider the parent's beliefs, but only to the extent that those beliefs may be probative of her religious practices. However, the court should not focus
on the official doctrines of the church. 17 Additionally, parental religion should be examined only to determine whether it will adversely
affect 18 the child's health or safety. 19
14. A child's "temporal health" includes his physical, mental and moral but not spiritual
well-being. Courts use the term "temporal" to refer to secular concerns, and to distinguish
them from religious or spiritual matters such as the child's eternal salvation or general relation
to a Supreme Being. See The American Heritage Dictionary 1325 (New College ed. 1980)
(defining "temporal" as "civil, secular, or lay, as distinguished from ecclesiastical"); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "spiritual" as "[r)elating to religious or ecclesiastical persons or affairs, as distinguished from 'secular' or lay, worldly or business matters").
See also 66 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1414 (1959); List, A Child and a Wall· A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 15-16, 56-57 (1963-64). Generally, American courts emphasize temporal welfare, as they cannot constitutionally or realistically attempt to determine
spiritual welfare. By forbidding the government from entering "the business of the churches,"
the first amendment reflects the judgment that ecclesiastics, not judges, should promote spiritual well-being. List, supra at 56-57.
15. The Supreme Court has declared that the state has a "compelling" interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor." See New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
16. See Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978); Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d
570, 576, 129 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1964).
17. This limitation on the court's inquiry comes in part from the free exercise clause cases
that state that while the law may not interfere with a person's religious beliefs, it may interfere
with the practices of those beliefs under certain circumstances. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Harris v. Harris, 343 So.2d 762, 764 (Miss. 1977). This limitation
also comes from the line of cases that state that the court must avoid delving into questions of
religious doctrine. See note 49 i,!fra. Mere inquiry into parents' religious practices and even
into their individual beliefs as they affect practices does not require the court to evaluate or
define official church doctrine. The goal of the inquiry is to determine the parents' likely
practices by looking at their personal religious beliefs when necessary. Evaluation of these
practices is acceptable because of the State's compelling interest in protecting children. See
note 15 i,!fra and accompanying text.
18. Courts will not award custody to a parent whose religious practices will harm the child,
but they disagree on the certainty and amount of harm that must be shown. Generally, the
courts require a factual showing of either actual or likely jeopardy to the child's temporal
mental health or physical safety. See, e.g., In re Marriage ofHadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566,619
P.2d 374, 382 (1980). Some cases suggest that it is almost impossible to show harm from a
religious practice. In Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), the appellate
court reversed the trial court and gave custody to the mother, a member of a Christian sect
called the "Exclusive Brethren." The sect discouraged or banned reading of anything but the
Bible. Its doctrine of "separation" from nonmembers meant that the child would be taught
that his father was unclean and that he could not associate with him. The mother had also
testified that she would "separate" from her son if he became disobedient. Despite this evidence, the appellate court awarded the mother custody because there was no showing of actual
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Although the courts generally refuse to prefer one religion to another, many of these same courts favor religious parents over nonreligious parents in their custody decisions. 20 This preference for
impairment of the child's well-being. It was not enough that the evidence indicated a
"probability of psychological impact." 59 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
In In re Marriage ofHadeen, the appellate court found "substantial evidence to support the
finding that Mrs. Hadeen's .first .fidelity is to the church, even to the extent of rejecting her
children." 619 P.2d at 382. There was also substantial evidence that the mother would not
allow the children to see their father if she were given custody, and that the children needed
continued contact with both parents. Despite these findings, the appellate court remanded the
case for a new trial because it was "likely that a determining factor here was the mother's
involvement with her church." This was improper, as the trial court had not found that the
mother's church membership "posed a threat to the mental or physical welfare of the children." 619 P.2d at 382.
However, in Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981), the Nebraska
Supreme Court considered one parent's religious practices to be potentially harmful and
awarded custody to the other parent. The mother, a Fatima Crusader, believed the child was
illegitimate because she and her husband were not married in the Fatima Crusader Church,
The mother said she would cut the child out of her life if she disobeyed the rules of the church.
The mother planned to send the child to a church school that required a release giving it full
permission to use corporal punishment and relieving it of all responsibility for injuries to
students.
19. The courts must limit their examination of parental religious practices to determining
the impact of the practices on the child. These governmental judgments of religious merit are
only justified by the compelling interest in protecting children's health and safety. See notes 816 supra and accompanying text.
20. Many courts have held that they may consider the extent of religious commitment in
determining what is in the child's best interest, though they may not prefer one religion to
another. For example, in Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wash. 2d 409, 289 P.2d 1001 (1955), the
court stated that it would not base custody on a parent's choice to bring the child up in a
religion different from that of the other parent. "But here, the children are not being given
religious training in any denomination and that fact should be considered . . . ." 47 Wash. 2d
at 416, 287 P.2d at 1005. This favorable treatment for religiousness is in contrast to both the
dicta in Schre!fels itself and to Washington cases that have refused to prefer one religion to
another. See, e.g., Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971). The Missouri
cases also contain this dichotomy. Compare Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326,332 (Mo. 1978)
(court may not prefer one religion to another, but it may consider the child's religious training
"in the defense of a challenged custodial parent"), with In re M.D.H., 595 S.W.2d 448, 450
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (court may base its custody determination on respondents' steady church
affiliation, as this relates to the child's best interest). The courts of other states also draw this
distinction between favoring one religion over another and favoring religion in general. See,
e.g., Allison v. Ovens, 4 Ariz. App. 406, 421 P.2d 929, 935 (although court may not choose
between religions, it may consider "the church and Sunday school habits of the children and
their respective parents"), vacated in part on other grounds, 102 Ariz. 520, 433 P.2d 968 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793,799,451 A.2d 374,378
(1982) (religion as it relates to the "concerns and temporal welfare" of the child is a proper
subject of inquiry); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482,232 S.E.2d 470 (1977) (while court may
not prefer one faith to another, it may consider mother's failure to take child to church).
While refusing to evaluate or weigh the intrinsic truth of different religious beliefs, the Pennsylvania courts consistently consider "spiritual well-being" to be part of the best interest equation. See, e.g., In re Custody of J.S.S., 298 Pa. Super. 428, 444 A.2d 1251 (1982); Morris v,
Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (1979); see also Anhalt v. Fesler, 6 Kan. App, 2d
921, 636 P.2d 224, 225 (1981) (religion and church attendance are "not alone sufficient to
determine the best interest of minor children," but are "factors to be considered"); T. v. H., 102
N.J. Super. 38,245 A.2d 221 (1968) (factoring religious training into the determination of the
child's best interest), '!ffd., 264 A.2d 244 (1970).
Courts in many states have not reported a custody dispute between a religious and nonreligious parent that discussed the issue of religious preference. However, when faced with a case
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religiousness deserves close constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme
Court has held repeatedly that the establishment clause bars the government from preferring religion to nonreligion. 21 Moreover, the
Court has consistently suggested that governmental preferences for
religion in general are just as constitutionally suspect as governmental preferences between religions.22 Yet many courts deciding cusinvolving religious parents with different beliefs, they often have declared their inability to
consider religion in broad terms, suggesting that these courts would refuse to prefer a religious
to a nonreligious parent when faced with that choice. See Quiner v. Quiller, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503,
516-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 563, 569-70, 161 P.2d 385,389 (1945);
Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145, 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); Frantzen v. Frantzen, 349
S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Salvaggio v. Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952).
21. Courts frequently cite the Supreme Court's declaration in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), that "[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
(Emphasis added.) In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216
(1963), the Supreme Court "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment
Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another." The Court said
that the principle that government cannot aid all religions has been "long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed." 374 U.S. at 217. Arguments that the establishment clause
allows a governmental preference for religiousness are "entirely untenable and of value only as
academic exercises." 374 U.S. at 217; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic - the nonbeliever - is
entitled to go his own way."); Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1963) (After forty years of Supreme Court interpretation, "the establishment clause bars certain governmental aids to religion even if impartially
afforded to all religious sects.").
Despite the Supreme Court's firm and consistent interpretation of the scope of the establishment clause, commentators continue to debate the framers' original intent. Compare
Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9-10
(1949), and Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion'~ 71
GEO. LJ. 1519, 1520-24 (1983) (framers intended to allow laws which aid all religions) with L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 154 (1967); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (1964); Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle,
36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1274, 1281 (1961); Kurland, supra note 6, at 9; and Sky, supra note 6, at
1403, 1417 (contra). Others feel that attempts to determine the framers' actual intent are
doomed by the paucity of historical evidence and the multiplicity of plausible historical interpretations. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237-38
(Brennan, J., concurring); Choper, supra note 6, at 263 (1968). Moreover, some evidence suggests that the framers' original intent cannot control modem interpretation of the establishment clause. The framers may have originally intended the establishment clause to prevent
the federal government from interfering with the established state churches. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Co,iflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 676
(1980). If so, after the establishment clause was applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, this original intent was contradicted by what is now regarded as a central purpose
of the first amendment - protection from state establishments. Id at 676.
22. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Supreme Court first determined that a
statutory denominational preference did not survive strict scrutiny analysis. See note 11 supra.
The Court then went on to analyze the preference under its special tripartite test used to determine whether a practice impermissibly aids religion over nonreligion. See notes 23-25 i,!fra
and accompanying text. The Court noted that while application of the tripartite test was not
"necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do reflect the same concerns that
warranted the application of strict scrutiny." 456 U.S. at 252. By applying both tests and
stating that they reflected the same concerns, the Court strongly suggested that the establishment clause treats preferences for religion over nonreligion as harshly as it treats preferences
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tody cases find the form.er permissible and the latter not.
The Supreme Court subjects laws arguably favoring religion over
nonreligion to a special tripartite test. First articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 23 the test is an accumulation of criteria developed by the
Court over the years. A law challenged as preferring religion to
nonreligion must pass all three parts of the test to satisfy the restrictions of the establishment clause. The test requires: (1) that the statute have a secular legislative purpose; (2) that its principal or
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) that the
statute not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."24 The constitutionality of the preference for religious over
nonreligious parents in custody disputes should be analyzed under
the Lemon test. 2s
between religions. For cases recognizing that courts may not prefer religious to nonreligious
parents, see note 81 infra.
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
25. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not apply the tripartite Lemon test in a
recent establishment clause challenge to a governmental preference for religion over nonreli•
gion. In Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court upheld the Nebraska legisla•
ture's practice of beginning each session with a prayer by a paid chaplain. The Court reasoned
that the first Congress must not have intended the establishment clause to forbid the practice,
as it passed legislation providing for paid chaplains in the House and Senate in the same week
it approved the draft of the first amendment for submission to the States. The majority stated
that this "unique history" led it to accept the view of the draftsmen of the first amendment that
this practice of prayer posed no real threat to the establishment clause. 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
The unique historical analysis in Marsh would not apply in the context of child custody
disputes. As Pfeffer states, the rare judge who can "put aside his own religious predilections
when deciding a custody controversy would . . . more probably act in consonance with Amer•
ican traditions if he disregarded completely the devoutness or irreligion of the competing ap•
plicants." Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 366. Case law also reflects the lack of a tradition of
favoring religion in child custody disputes. Some of the earliest cases discussing religion in
child custody are among the most adamant in arguing that it should not be a factor. See
Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. Rep. 399 (1875); Fuller v. Fuller, 249 Mich. 19, 20-21, 227 N.W. 541,
542 (1929); Baker v. Bird, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (Mo. 1913); Rone v. Rone, 20 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1929); Kendall v. Williams, 233 S.W. 296, 297-98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), although the Court applied the Lemon test, it
did state its past and present unwillingness "to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area." 104 S. Ct. at 1362. The dissent was puzzled by the majority's dictum because
"ever since its initial formulation, the Lemon test has been consistently looked upon as the
fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis." 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, Marsh is the only case where the Court has not applied either the Lemon test
or strict scrutiny. Brennan stated that he could "only conclude that with today's unsupported
assertion, the Court hopes to provide a belated excuse for the failure in Marsh to address the
analysis of the Lemon test." 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
There is no reason to doubt that the Lemon test is the correct way to analyze preferences
for religiousness in child custody cases. The test is firmly established, and the Marsh analysis
does not apply to the present context. Most of the child custody cases discussed in this Note,
however, were decided before the formulation of the Lemon test. Only one court to date has
applied the Lemon test in a reported custody case. That court concluded that a preference for
religion over nonreligion, when the child had expressed no mature religious preference, failed
all three parts of the Lemon test. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1244 (Alaska 1979).
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Considering Religion Fails the Secular Purpose Requirement of
the Establishment Clause

Courts differ on their announced reasons for considering a parent's religion in child custody disputes. Some say they do so to promote the child's spiritual welfare, 26 while others claim they are
promoting the child's temporal well-being. 27 Still other courts simply refer approvingly to one parent's religiousness and plans for the
child's religious training without explaining why they think this is
important.28
A number of courts consider a potential custodian's religion in
order to enhance the child's spiritual well-being. 29 By definition,
however, attempts to enhance spiritual welfare serve a religious
rather than a secular purpose.30 Thus, custody decisions considering
a parent's religion solely for its effect on the child's spiritual welfare
fail the secular purpose requirement of the Lemon test.
The claim that religion may be considered for its effects on a
child's temporal well-being presents a more complex question. Many
courts refer to the supposed causal connection between a parent's
religion and her morality,31 or more generally, between a parent's
26. See notes 29-30 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Reaves v. Reaves, 399 So. 2d 311, 312-13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Sigesmund v.
Sigesmund, 115 Cal. App. 2d 628, 631, 252 P.2d 713, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Murphy v.
Murphy, 143 Conn. 600, 603, 124 A.2d 891, 893 (1956); Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 54950, 100 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1957); Wellcome v. Wilk, 339 Ill. App. 444, 446, 90 N.E.2d 260, 261
(1950); Carey v. Carey, 211 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1973); Guess v. Glenn, 294 S.W.2d 940
(Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Lemoine v. Lemoine, 393 So. 2d 251,252 (La. Ct. App. 1980), writ refused,
395 So. 2d 1354 (1981); Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 248, 400 P.2d 632, 634 (1965);
Ex parte Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
29. See Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 502, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981) (court must
consider spiritual welfare); Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358,362,204 S.E.2d 678,681 (1974)
(trial judge examined mother's religiousness to help him place the child in an environment that
would encourage the development of the child's physical, mental, moral and spiritual faculties). A number of courts include spiritual well-being as part of their best interest litany. See,
e.g., Deckman v. Deckman, 15 Md. App. 553, 292 A.2d 112 (1972); Stanfield v. Stanfield, 435
S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d 470, 472
(1977); In re Custody ofJ.S.S., 298 Pa. Super. 428,432,444 A.2d 1251, 1253 (1982); Commonwealth ex rel Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super. 361, 365, 108 A.2d 73, 75 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955). Hawaii and South Carolina have the only statutes that list spiritual well-being as a factor for the judge to consider in determining the child's best interest. See
HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 571-46(5) (Supp. 1982); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
30. See note 14 supra. Various commentators on the use of religion in adoption have noted
the religious nature of "spiritual well-being." Imputing a religion to a child up for adoption
"cannot be justified on the theory that the child's spiritual welfare will best be promoted by one
religion rather than another or by any religion rather than none, for '[t]he law does not profess
to know what is a right belief. . . • [E]nhancing the child's spiritual well-being is religious in
nature, not secular." Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 780, 814, 818 (1971); see also List, supra note 14, at 15; Note, Religion as a
Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54 Cot.UM. L. REV. 376, 395 (1954).
3 I. Some courts equate being religious with being a good person. They presume that
religion is identical to or at least an indication of worthiness, reputability and morality. See
Vanover v. Hunley, 309 Ky. 461, 462-65, 218 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (1949); Meyer v. Hackler, 219
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religion and a good home life for the child. 32 In this way, courts link
religion to valid secular concerns - the moral and ethical beliefs
and behavior of potential custodians,33 and the effects these will
have on the child.
Other courts, however, have rejected the supposed correlation between religion and morality, or between religion and a good home
environment. 34 One court went so far as to say that "numerous
profound thinkers have fixed convictions that all religion is bad, particularly so in the rearing of children." 35 Legal scholars,36 philosoLa. 750, 758, 54 So. 2d 7, 10 (1951); Scanlon v. Scanlon, 29 N.J. Super. 317,326, 102 A.2d 656,
662 (1954); Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wash. 2d 409, 415, 287 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1955).
32. Some courts assume that a religious atmosphere is an attribute of the good home that
every child needs. They also believe that a parent's provision for the child's religious educa•
tion may indicate that the parent is concerned about the moral climate in which the child is
being reared. See Allison v. Ovens, 4 Ariz. App. 496, 421 P.2d 929, 934-35, vacated in par/ 011
other grounds, 102 Ariz. 520, 433 P.2d 968 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Painter v.
Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1395-96, 140 N.W.2d 152, 155-56 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel
Bendrick v. White, 403 Pa. 55, 62, 169 A.2d 69, 73 (1961).
33. Secular morality is a legitimate governmental concern. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (a legislature may "legitimately act .•. to protect 'the social inter•
est in order and morality'" (citation omitted)); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), ajfd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (state may regulate to promote
morality and decency). Thus, it is permissible for a judge to consider the moral fitness of the
potential custodians in child custody cases. For examples of custody statutes and cases consid•
ering morality, see note 52 iefra. In an example from the analogous context of adoption, the
New Jersey court considered the religious beliefs of potential parents to be evidence of their
ethical and moral character. In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971). As a
result, the court held that questions concerning religion as it bears on ethics and morals were
permissible, as they would serve the secular purpose of indicating "moral fitness to adopt in
relation to how the applicants will conduct themselves as adopting parents." 59 N.J. at 57,279
A.2d at 796. The court also held, however, that religion could not be the sole consideration
used in making the adoption decision, as this would serve only a religious and not a secular
purpose. See also note 41 iefra.
34. See Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 573-77, 129 N.W.2d 134, 136-38 (1964), where
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the establishment clause barred the trial court from
considering the mother's agnosticism, as her beliefs posed no threat to the child. Although the
dissent stated that "[m]orality, character and the dignity of human nature depends upon spiri•
tual values and the recognition of a deity," 24 Wis. 2d at 579, 129 N.W.2d at 140, the majority
held that it was "legally untenable" to equate the mother's "skepticism with a lack of morals."
24 Wis. 2d at 577, 129 N.W.2d at 138; see also In re Adoption of "E," 59 N.J. 36, 58-59, 279
A.2d 785, 797 (Weintraub, J., concurring) (arguing that inquiry into religion was "irrelevant to
the true issue" of moral character and not a "proper concern of a terrestrial judge"); Wilson v.
Wilson, 473 P.2d 595,599 (Wyo. 1970) ("We know ofno standard set by any of the courts as to
how much religion must be practised by a parent before such parent can be considered a
proper person to have custody of children.").
35. Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 516-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); see also note 47 iefra.
36. See Klaff, The Tender Years .Doctrine: A .Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 351 n.81
(1982) (''There is no known coincidence between good parenting or healthy child development
and particular religious beliefs or practices . . . [t]he general rule is that a parent cannot be
denied custody solely because of his or her religion or the lack thereof."). The importance of
religion to a child's development has been addressed most frequently in the adoption context.
In placing children, courts often attempt to match the religion of the child, regardless of that
child's age, with that of the adoptive parents. See Note, Religious Matching Statutes and Adop•
lion, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 262 (1976). Commentators addressing this issue often cite sociological
studies that challenge the assumption that religion is an important attribute of a good custodian or good home life. See Broeder & Barrett, Impact ofReligious Fae/ors in Nebraska Adop•
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phers37 and sociologists38 have also disputed the existence of any
lions, 38 NEB. L. REV. 641 (1959); Co=ent, supra note 30, at 814-15; Note, supra; see also
SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 59 (1956), cited in Breeder & Barrett, supra at
667 n.64. Schapiro described the differences of opinion over the "desirability of formalized
religion in the adoptive home" at the 1955 National Conference on Adoption. Opinions at the
conference varied from "those who believed that no home could be adequate for the nurture of
a child unless parents were devoutly religious, to those who believed that ethical, moral parents, though they observed no formal religion, could provide a desirable home for a child."
Breeder & Barrett, supra at 667 n.64. Co=entators have also observed that there is "no
convincing evidence that children without formal religious training are necessarily less happy
or less well adjusted than children with such training." Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 351. Others
note that juvenile delinquency does not appear to correlate with a lack of religion. See Breeder & Barrett, supra at 669-71; Note, Constitutionality of Mandatory Religious Requirements in
Child Care, 64 YALE L.J. 772, 782 (1955). But see Note, Religious Factors in Adoprion, 28 IND.
L.J. 401, 404-05 (1953) ("Seldom is a child's need for religious inspiration disputed. . . . Religion is an integral part of child development.").
37. See, e.g., B. RUSSELL, Whal is an Agnostic?, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF BERTRAND
RUSSELL 578 (R. Egner & L. Denonn eds. 1961):
[A]s a statistical fact, Agnostics are not more prone to murder than other people; in fact,
rather less so. They have the same motives for abstaining from murder as other people
have. . . . A man's anti-social wishes may be restrained by a wish to please God, but
they may also be restrained by a wish to please his friends, or to win the respect of his
community, or to be able to contemplate himself without disgust. But if he has no such
wishes, the mere abstract precepts of morality will not keep him straight.
Russell argues that Christianity does not have a monopoly on the system of ethics with which
it is now identified. Id at 579.
38. Disagreement on the value of religious training emerges clearly from the sociological
literature. Compare Hadaway & Roof, Religious Commitment and the Quality ofL!fe in American Society, 19 REV. RELIGIOUS RESEARCH 295, 303 (1978) (concluding that persons who
placed importance on their religious faith tended to feel their lives were more worthwhile and
that religion is positively associated with the quality of life); Morgan, A Research Note on
Religion and Morality: Are Religious People Nice People?, 61 Soc. FORCES 683 (1983) (finding
people who prayed frequently to be predisposed to "good," "friendly" and "cooperative behavior"); and Smith, Weigert & Thomas, Se!f Esteem and Religiosity: An Analysis of Catholic
Adolescents from Five Cu/lures, 18 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 51, 52-53, 55 (1979) (finding a
correlation between self-esteem and religiosity but noting that studies on this have gone in
both directions), wilh Francis, Teenage Values Today, 45 NEW SocY. 687, 688 (1978) (concluding from a survey of children in England, Scotland and Wales that "the churches are exerting
little moral influence on the young today"); Hong, Anomia and Religiosity: Some Evidencefor
Reconceptualization, 22 REV. RELIGIOUS RESEARCH 233 (1981) (concluding from a study of
anomia, or personal normlessness, that neither religious affiliation nor religious identification
"was a significant factor in the variation of anornia"); Hunsberger, A Reexaminalion of rhe
Antecedenrs ofAposrasy, 21 Rev. Religious Research 158, 167 (1980) (concluding from a study
of apostasy that "apostates did not differ from nonapostates regarding personal happiness or
adjustment, nor present or predicted grade point average"); and Steiber, The Influence of rhe
Religious Fae/or on Civil and Sacred Tolerance, 1958-71, 58 Soc. FORCES 811 (1980) (finding a
negative correlation between religiousness and tolerance of religious and political criticism).
See also Thompson, Are We Obliged lo Fulure Others?, ALTERNATIVE'FUTURES, Spring 1978,
at 29, 35 ("Few would be willing to argue that the daily choices of Western man are influenced
to any great extent" by traditional religious belief.). Moreover, a number of the studies finding
positive values to be associated with religion found this correlation with religious beliefs and
not with churchgoing per se, which is what courts generally examine. See Hadaway & Roof,
supra; Morgan, supra.
Many studies have been done on the relationship between deviant behavior in juveniles
and religion, again with mixed results. The results obtained to date are contradictory and, if
anything, indicate that religion does not reduce juvenile delinquency. See In re Adoption of
"E," 59 N.J. 36, 56, 279 A.2d 785, 796 (1971) (court makes this observation about the studies
cited to it); N. TEETERS & J. REINEMANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 159-64 (1950)
(studies indicate that religious children are no more honest than nonreligious children); Tittle
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correlation between religion and the secular concerns relevant to
custody determinations.
Although there is sharp disagreement about the existence of a
correlation between religion and morality, there is general agreement that morality can exist outside of religion. The Supreme Court
has stated its view that a person without a traditional religious affiliation may have as strong a moral code as a person with such traditional beliefs.39 Other authorities, following this reasoning, have
found that nonreligious parents can be morally desirable custodians.40 Thus, since morality can exist in the absence of religion, any
& Welsh, Religiosity and .Deviance: Toward a Contingency Theory of Constraining Effects, 61
Soc. FORCES 653 (1983) (research is inconclusive and contradictory); see also Assoc!ATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF THE ADMINIS•
TRATION OF LAWS RELATING TO THE FAMILY, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF
NEW YoRK CITY 84 (1954); A. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 109 n.7 (1953). One "now
familiar'' idea is that "religiosity predicts conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious
institutions but not to rules prohibited by society as a whole.••." Tittle & Welsh, supra at
659; see also B. WILSON, RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 37-38, 155-56 (1982) (modem secular society derives morality from the demands of a rational structure, rather than from
religion); N. TEETERS & J. REINEMANN, supra at 164 ("most persons are likely to keep their
religion quite separate from their moral code"). But see Wattenburg, Church Attendance and
Juvenile Misconduct, 34 Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 195, 202 (1950) (author's studies indicate that
"church attendance is part of a way of living which generally reduces tendencies toward juvenile misconduct" although other studies showed inconsistent and contradictory findings),
39. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). The Court held that in order to
qualify for conscientious objector status, the applicant's opposition to war must "stem from the
registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these
beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions." The Court thought that
if an individual "deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical and moral in source
and content • • . those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual 'a place parallel to
that filled by ... God' in traditionally religious persons." 398 U.S. at 340. Justice Harlan,
concurring, stated that "[c]ommon experience teaches that among 'religious' individuals some
are weak and others strong adherents to tenets and this is no less true of individuals whose
lives are guided by personal ethical considerations." 398 U.S. at 358-59. Harlan then went on
to make a comment that is particularly relevant to the custody situation. "It goes without
saying that the First Amendment is perforce a guarantee that the conscience of religion may
not be preferred simply because organized religious groups in general are more visible than the
individual who practices morals and ethics on his own." 398 U.S. at 360 n.12; see also E,
ERICSON, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 108 (1982) ("[C]aring and compassion are the very roots that nuture our moral experience and make us human. We need not
look elsewhere to find the source of morality."); Freeman, supra note 21, at 1554-55 (slating
that a moral code is separate from a religious belief system, and pointing to Bertrand Russell
as a man who subscribed to a moral code while rejecting religion).
40. See Fuller v. Fuller, 249 Mich. 19, 20-21, 227 N.W. 541, 542 (1929) (retaining custody
in the mother despite the fact that she did not send the child to Sunday School, noting that her
"moral character was not attacked"); Rone v. Rone, 20 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929)
(retaining custody in the mother even though she did not send the child to Sunday school,
noting that she herself might have taught the child "the secrets of life and the ways of virtue
and rectitude of conduct"); In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 591, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13-14 (N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953) (in placing a child adjudged neglected, the judge stated in dictum his
view that a child could be taught ethics without being given religious training); Kendall v.
Williams, 233 S.W. 296, 297-98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (refusing to weigh the relative religiousness of two sets of potential custodians, as they were all good people); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 589 (1968) ("It does not follow, however, that a
person who does not have religious convictions cannot be a moral person or an affectionate
and successful parent. A fortiori it does not follow that proof of weekly attendance at church
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court that does not allow evidence of morality in a nonreligious parent to counter assumptions about the temporal value of religion
would seem to be indicating a clearly impermissible concern with
spiritual rather than temporal well-being.41
Even if religion were correlated with morality, and even if courts
routinely allowed evidence of morality to outweigh any preference
for a religious parent, a number of factors still suggest that courts
may not consider a parent's religion as proof of her morality. First,
grave constitutional problems arise when discrimination is directed
against a group because of a statistical correlation between group
members and a particular characteristic. For example, the Supreme
Court has struck down gender discrimination based on correlations
between men and alcohol-related driving offenses, and between women and economic dependency. 42 Although these decisions rest on
establishes one's qualifications as a parent."); Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 351 ("Certainly, there is
no evidence that moral training or character development can be effected only by religious
education . . . ."); Comment, supra note 30, at 815 (no evidence supports the view that "religion is a necessary criterion of morality").
Conversely, it is also inappropriate to "stop the inquiry into moral fitness merely upon
assurance that the applicants believe in a Supreme Being and attend church regularly. Such
belief may well be inconclusive of the question." In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 49-50, 279
A.2d 785, 792 (1971); see also Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. 399, 402 (1875) ("It is unnecessary to say,
that a woman may attend church, may teach in a Sabbath school, . • . and yet be wholly unfit
to be the mistress over a girl . . . .").
41. See In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 49, 279 A.2d 785, 792 (1971), where the court
found that considering religion as it bears on ethics and morals served a valid secular purpose.
See note 33 supra. However, this secular purpose disappeared when the prospective parents
were shown to be of "high moral character," and the court refused to give their lack of religious beliefs any further consideration. As morality had been established, "the only purpose
in requiring religious affiliation and belief in a Supreme Being can be religious." 59 N.J. at 56,
279 A.2d at 796.
42. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), rehg. denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), the Court
struck down on equal protection grounds an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under the age of21 and females under the age of 18. The State offered evidence
that 2% of males as compared to 0.18% of females aged 18-20 had been arrested for "alcoholrelated driving offenses." 429 U.S. at 201. Although the Court regarded this statistical disparity as minimal and was unimpressed by this evidence for that reason, the opinion cast doubt on
the use of statistics generally to validate the use of a proxy when constitutional rights are at
stake. "[P)rior cases have consistently rejected the use of sex as a decision making factor even
though the statutes in question certainly rested on far more predictive empirical re!ationships
than this." 429 U.S. at 202. The Court gave as examples Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), cases in which the Court found
empirical evidence to be unsatisfactory in defense of "mandatory dependency tests for men but
not for women . . . even though we recognized that husbands are still far less likely to be
dependent on their wives than vice versa." Craig, 429 U.S. at 202 n.13. The Court went on to
say that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one
that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the equal protection
clause." 429 U.S. at 204. Thus, "even when state officials have posited sociological or empirical justifications for these gender-based distinctions, the courts have struck down discrimination." 429 U.S. at 208. The very existence of such statistics makes the mandate of the equal
protection clause all the more imperative. As the Court stated:
In fact, social science studies that have uncovered quantifiable differences in drinking
tendencies dividing along both racial and ethnic lines strongly suggest the need for application of the Equal Protection Clause in preventing discriminatory treatment that almost
certainly would be perceived as invidious. In sum, the principles embodied in the Equal
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equal protection grounds, the Court's analysis of the role of statistics
applies to the present context. The Court appears to view statistics
as too potentially powerful a justification for discrimination against
protected groups. 43 Under present Supreme Court doctrine, discrimination against the nonreligious is treated even more strictly than
gender discrimination.44 Since statistical correlations may not justify
gender discrimination, they should not be allowed to justify religious
discrimination. 45
The great variety among religions is another factor posing subProtection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose
fitting generalities.
429 U.S. at 298-99. Craigs suspicion of statistics seems to be based on the fear of allowing this
kind of wedge to erode the protection afforded to traditionally discriminated against groups,
In essence, the Court seems to be saying that it is normatively wrong and just too dangerous.
43. See note 42 supra.
44. The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to laws granting denominational preferences, and the Lemon test - a test reflecting the "same concerns" as strict scrutiny - to laws
preferring religion to nonreligion. See notes 9-11, 22-24 supra and accompanying text. It applies only middle-level scrutiny, however, to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. See
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), re/1g. denied,
429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Thus, while laws granting denominational preferences must be closely
fitted to further compelling governmental interests, and laws preferring religion to nonreligion
must pass all three prongs of the Lemon test, laws discriminating on the basis of sex survive
constitutional scrutiny if they are "substantially related" to the achievement of "important
governmental objectives." See Orr, 440 U.S. at 279; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
45. The Supreme Court's suspicion of statistics in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
rehg. denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), see note 42 supra, coupled with the higher level of scrutiny
in the religious area, see note 44 supra, means that even if statistics showed that people of one
or all religions were more moral it is unlikely that a court may constitutionally prefer one
religion to another, or religion to nonreligion. Moreover, there are real dangers in allowing
religion to be used as a proxy for morality in child custody cases. First, many courts have
misused religion to promote spriritual rather than temporal goals. See notes 29-30 supra and
accompanying text. Second, custody cases are particularly susceptible to abuse, as trial judges
have wide discretion. See Gunter v. Gunter, 219 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); see also
Co=ent, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81
DICK. L. REV. 733, 737 (1977) ("Since identifying 'good' parental behavior is at best a subjective process, a parent is victim to a particular judge's values and beliefs."). The concerns in
these cases are not unlike those delineated by the Supreme Court in cases involving parochial
school teachers of secular subjects. In co=enting on the dangers that a religious teacher in a
parochial school poses to the "separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of
pre-college education," the Court noted that it was not implying that teachers would act in bad
faith but only that the "conflict of functions inheres in the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
Just as it is difficult for a religious teacher to remain religiously neutral, it is also difficult
for a religious judge to do so. As the Court said of such teachers: "What would appear to
some to be essential to good citizenship might well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. For a religious judge it may be hard to separate a
religious home from a good home. As one commentator has noted, "there is perhaps no situation which has betrayed the judiciary to yield to its own religious preferences so subtly as the
issue of parental abandonment in the face of rival religious claims between parents or relatives
over some poor child who had been made the object of religious zeal." Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARV. L. REV. 485, 492 (1916),
quoted in In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 15, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 358 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936).
The Vardinakis court found it crucial for judges to guard against this "danger within
[them]selves, frequently not consciously recognized" in order to reach a fair result. Vardinakis,
160 Misc. at 14-15, 289 N.Y.S. at 358.
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stantial problems for the use of religion as evidence of morality or a
good home. Different religions and groups within the same religion
emphasize different values.46 This diversity means that adherence to
any one religion cannot be equivalent to adherence to any other religion in terms of the presumptive benefit to the child's temporal wellbeing.47 Yet courts simply assume that all religions teach the secular
46. This notion is well accepted. See N. TEETERS & J. REINEMANN, supra note 38, at 617
("[T]he church is divided into various philosophic shades, running the gamut of unbending
orthodoxy to humanism."); B. WILSON, supra note 38, at 37 ("Within dominant religious traditions, it is the rule rather than the exception that there are different denominations or sects
..•. Not unusually, these religious groups espouse divergent moral norms . . . their operative schemes of morality may differ significantly . . . ."); Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 23, 24-25; Smith, Weigert & Thomas, supra note 38,
at 52; see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Scores
of sects flourish in this country by teaching what to me are queer notions. It is plain that there
is wide variety in American religious taste.").
On many issues, liberal religious groups arguably hold more in common with secularists
than with the conservatives within their own churches. See Hitchcock, Church, State, and
Moral Values: The Limits ofAmerican Pluralism, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., at 3, 5 (making
this observation about homosexual rights and the "sexual revolution"); see also L. PFEFFER,
Goo, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 20 (1975). Pfeffer observes that traditional Catholics,
Fundamentalist Protesants and Orthodox Jews all hope for a world with "no divorce, no contraception, no abortion, no obscene books or pictures, [and] no homosexuality." In contrast,
liberal Protestants, liberal Jews and deists seek freedom of thought and expression, recognize a
woman's right to control her own body and endorse the sexual revolution. See also B. RusSELL, supra note 37, at 580; Roof, Alienation and Apostasy, 15 SOCIETY, May-June 1978, at 41,
45.
47. See, e.g., TEETERS & REINEMANN, supra note 38, at 162 (studies of criminal activity
show variations among members of different religious groups); Hadaway & Roof, supra note
38, at 304 (concluding that the relationship between religious beliefs and quality of life was
"stronger among Catholics and fringe Christian groups than among Protestants," but finding a
negative correlation between religion and quality of life for Jews).
The diversity in religious doctrine not only means that different religions can enhance a
child's secular morality to different extents, but also that they can inflict varying degrees of
damage on a child's morals. The Supreme Court has branded certain religious practices as
immoral. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding the conviction of
members of a Mormon sect for practicing polygamy, as polygamy is an "immoral purpose"
forbidden by the Mann Act). In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), the
Court denied tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. Both
schools involved in the case were dedicated to the teaching of Christian religious beliefs and
discriminated because of their interpretations of the Bible. Although the Court never called
the discrimination immoral, its disapproval could not have been stronger. The Court stated
that "racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice." 103 S. Ct. at 2029. For other examples of discrimination urged in the name of
religion, see "What Goes on Here?", an anti-semitic tract printed by the Lord's Covenant
Church; J. FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA- 53 (1981) ("If a person is not a Christian, he is
inherently a failure."); J. Chick, Are Roman Catholics Christians?(1981) (concluding that they
are not Christians "in any sense of the word" and are thus "very lost").
In addition to encouraging discrimination, religious groups can harm a child's secular
morals in other ways. One recent paper argued that "many Christian denominations" as well
as many of the new religious movements that have proliferated in North America since the late
1960's encourage among their adherents a reduced sense of moral accountability. Bird, The
Pursuit of Innocence? New Religious Movements and Moral Accountability, 40 Soc. ANALYSIS
335 (1979). See also Wallis, Recruiting Christian Manpower, 15 SOCIETY, May-June 1978, at
72, for a discussion of religious groups that contravene traditional sexual morality. One Christian group, the Children of God, uses "the sexual attractiveness of young females as a means
of recruiting new disciples and allies for the Children of God." This group believes that "those
who are saved and completely commit their lives to God's service may dispense with moral
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morals with which the courts are concemed.48 For courts honestly to
consider parental religion for its secular worth, they should identify
the secular values that are important in making a custody decision
and require a factual showing that the religion embodies those
values.
This suggested approach, however, runs into two serious
problems. First, it requires courts to probe and resolve questions of
religious doctrine, an activity that the Constitution forbids. 49 Second, this approach results in court preferences for some religions
over others based on the doctrines they espouse. This preference is
unconstitutional unless the religious practices involved threaten the
child's health or safety. 50
regulation in favor of higher imperatives." Wallis, supra at 72-73. This discussion makes clear
the difficulty of arguing that all forms of religious training necessarily benefit the child's tem•
poral well-being. Yet absent evidence of practices that threaten the child's health or safety, all
these religions must be treated with equal favor. See note 50 i,!fra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
49. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the first amendment forbids courts from
defining, weighing, deciding or judging questions of religious doctrine. See Presbyterian
Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), where the Court held that the Georgia court had
improperly adjudicated a property claim made by two local churches that had withdrawn from
the general church hierarchy. The Georgia court had determined the right to the property by
examining whether the general church had departed from its tenets of faith and violated its
own moral and ethical code. The Supreme Court held that a civil court was not allowed to
adjudicate the issue of the church's moral and ethical standards. The Court said that the
method Georgia had used to resolve the dispute required it to "determine matters at the very
core of a religion - the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of
those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the first amendment forbids civil courts from playing
such a role." 393 U.S. at 450; see also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 710 (1976), relzg. denied, 429 U.S. 873 ("[The principle that courts decide] church
property disputes without resolving controversies over religious doctrine ... applies with
equal force to church disputes over church polity and administration."). For other Supreme
Court cases stating that courts must avoid delving into questions of religious doctrine, see
generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2035 n.30 (1983); Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 602-10 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commn.,
397 U.S. 664,697 n.l (1970) {opinion of Harlan, J.); Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871). See
also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (absent clear expression of congressional
intent, National Labor Relations Act not to be construed as applying to teachers in churchoperated schools); c.f. State ex rel Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 585, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (1913)
(The state has an interest "in having all of its children reared in a good moral atmosphere ••.
but [it] cannot, under our present [state] Constitution, undertake to decide what form of religious instruction is best for any person."); L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 288 ("The freedom
and independence of churches would be in grave danger if the state undertook to define religious heresy or orthodoxy.").
In the context of child custody disputes, it is easy to imagine a situation where one parent
claims that her religion espouses certain moral principles. The other parent could then cha!•
lenge this, either by saying that the parent had mischaracterized her religion's doctrines or by
claiming that she actually belonged to a congregation that had departed from the general
church's teachings. The court would then be faced with the type of question presented by a
number of the preceding cases, and it would be unable to resolve the issue.
50. See notes 8-19 supra and accompanying text. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). In Yoder, the Court held that Amish children in Wisconsin did not have to attend
school after the eighth grade, despite the stale compulsory education laws that required atten-
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There is a final problem with considering religion as evidence of
morality or a good home life, even assuming that this inquiry has a
valid secular purpose. It may be impermissible for a court to consider religion if there is another way to achieve the court's purpose
that does not employ religious means. The establishment clause arguably bars practices that use religious means to achieve secular purposes when secular means to achieve the same objectives would
suffi.ce. 51
Courts deciding custody cases can look directly at the moral and
dance until age 16. The Amish successfully claimed that school attendance during this period
might well lead to the eventual destruction of the Amish community as it then existed, and
thus the law violated their right to freely exercise their religion. It is possible to interpret Yoder
as undermining the notion that certain religions cannot be preferred to others, since it is clear
that the Court was strongly influenced by the Amish's long history of lawfulness and selfsufficiency, see 406 U.S. at 212-13, 222, although such considerations are theoretically irrelevant. See 406 U.S. at 246-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In placing so much emphasis on these
factors, the Court seemingly implied that in the absence of such characteristics a similar claim
would be denied.
It is important to note, however, that Yoder was a free exercise clause case, not an establishment clause case. Free exercise cases often involve religious groups claiming exemptions
from otherwise valid laws, such as the compulsory school attendance law in Yoder. While
occasionally there are valid arguments for exempting members of certain religions in order to
protect their free exercise rights, the Court arguably has an interest in guarding itself against
endless claims of exemption from otherwise valid laws. Thus, the Court took pains to distinguish the Amish. 406 U.S. at 212-13. Seemingly recognizing that it was treading on controversial ground, the Court stated, almost apologetically, that
Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in
which society as a whole has important interests.
406 U.S. at 215-16. Even if certain religions must be singled out in order to protect their
members' free exercise rights, there is no comparable argument for religious preferences in
establishment clause cases because groups making establishment clause claims usually seek to
end discriminatory state treatment rather than to gain special privileges.
Yoder does not appear to have had any effect in the establishment clause area. The courts
that have addressed the issue of preference for one religion over another in the custody context
have continued to assert that traditional and nontraditional religions are to be treated alike,
except when the practices of a religion threaten the child's health or safety. See notes 8-19
supra and accompanying text.
51. Before Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), it was clear that the establishment
clause required the use of secular means when they were adequate to achieve secular purposes.
See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982) (striking down a Massachusetts
law giving churches and schools the right to veto liquor license applications from businesses
within 500 feet of the church or school, since the valid secular purposes of the statute could be
"readily accomplished by other means"); see also Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 644, 680
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (establishment clause forbids government use of essentially
religious means to achieve secular purposes when secular means would achieve the same
ends); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws, as
they served secular purposes that could not be served by purely secular means).
However, the Supreme Court has recently turned its back on this requirement without
explanation. In Lynch, the Court deemed "irrelevant" the argument that the City of Pawtucket could have achieved its secular purposes without displaying the creche. 104 S. Ct. at
1363 n.7. In dissent, Justice Brennan found it
puzzling, to say the least, that the Court today should find "irrelevant" . . . the fact that
the City's secular objectives can be readily and fully accomplished without including the
creche, since only last Term in Larkin v. Grendel's Den . . . the Court relied upon precisely the same point in striking down a Massachusetts statute.
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ethical beliefs and behavior of potential custodians. 52 Moreover, it
appears that courts could better predict the child's moral development by focusing on the parents' day-to-day conduct rather than on
their church attendance or plans for the child's religious training.53
Using religion to evaluate morals and ethics, then, serves no secular
purpose that cannot be served by means "that would not even remotely or incidentally give state aid to religion." 54
104 S. Ct. at 1372 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Since the requirement that courts use secular means to achieve secular goals whenever
possible was well established, the Court may well resurrect it in future cases. The requirement
has a solid basis in the general rule that the state must regulate conduct in the public interest in
a way that does not unnecessarily or unduly infringe on the first amendment religion provisions. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 450; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940);
see also School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,265 n.29 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) Qisting numerous cases to illustrate the principle that government must
employ means that would least interfere with "the exercise of constitutional liberties" when
first amendment freedoms are threatened).
Even if the Court fails to return to this requirement as a separate standard to be met, the
fact that a court uses religion when it need not casts suspicion on that court's purpose for
considering religion. Justice Brennan observed in Lynch that
two compelling aspects of this case indicate that our generally prudent "reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives" to a governmental body . . . should be overcome.
First, . . . all of Pawtucket's "valid secular objectives can be readily accomplished by
other means" . . . The inclusion of a distinctively religious element . . . demonstrates
that a narrower sectarian purpose lay behind the decision to include a nativity scene,
104 S. Ct. at 1372-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Abington, 374 U.S. at 233, in which the
state argued that beginning the school day with Bible readings promotes secular morality, The
Court, however, struck down the practice. Writing separately, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]o
the extent that only religious materials will serve this purpose, it seems to me that the purpose
as well as the means is so plainly religious that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by the
Establishment Clause." 374 U.S. at 280 (emphasis deleted).
52. A number of statutes instruct the judge to consider the moral fitness of the respective
parents without mentioning religion. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(3)(f) (Harrison Supp.
1983); Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-10 (Smith Supp. 1983). Others instruct the court to provide for
the child's moral welfare, also without including parental religion as a consideration in this
decision. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 3109.04(B)(l)(c) (Anderson Supp. 1983), In addition, there are cases in which courts have looked at the morals of potential custodians but have
not examined their religiousness. See, e.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960),
53. See E. ERICSON, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT 103 (1982) ("[A]n
atheist can be, and often is, as morally good as any believer. Being a person formed in a
relationship of mutual caring and trust is more decisive in shaping character than moral indoctrination or theology."); see also N. Teeters & J. Reinemann, supra note 38, at 163 (describing
studies that indicate that parents, not religious leaders, are the strongest source "of personality
influence and formation, especially so far as moral judgments are concerned"), These last
authors described an unsuccessful attempt to teach children honesty and concluded:
(W]e have not yet devised any mechanical character-building program for young people
to substitute for the day-to-day relationship between parents and their children. Home
training is still of vital importance. A few hours each day spent in school and one or two
hours per week spent in Sunday School . . . cannot offset the influence of a home where
the moral tone is on a low level. Where home influences are good, the child will profit
little in morality by participation in these organizations.

Id
54. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961); see also Comment, supra note 30, at
816:
Although the moral development of a child is a secular purpose, and religious training
may be one way of promoting this purpose, it clearly is not the only way. The same goal
can be achieved by simply providing that adoptive parents meet the state's moral qualifi-
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A court preference for parental religiousness to promote the spiritual or temporal welfare of the child serves no valid secular purpose.
Such a preference thus fails to satisfy the first part of the Lemon test.
Even if it did, however, the preference would still have to meet the
second and third parts; it must not have the principal or primary
effect of advancing religion nor foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

B. Favoring the Religious Parent Has the Principal and Primary
Effect ofAdvancing Religion
Even if a practice serves a valid secular purpose that could not be
achieved by secular means, it still violates the establishment clause if
it has the principal or primary effect of advancing religion. 55 An
examination of the practical effects of preferring religious to nonreligious parents in custody disputes leads to the conclusion that the
practice fails the second part of the Lemon test and also sheds some
light on the real reason for the preference. 56
Despite its use of the words "principal or primary effect," the test
is not necessarily satisfied by a showing that the "primary effect" of
the preference is placing the child with the more moral parent. A
preference that primarily serves legitimate ends is not "immune from
further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and
immediate effect of advancing religion." 57 Under either phrasing of
cations. It is well settled that the state may not use religious means to accomplish secular
goals if those goals may be achieved by nonreligious means.
It is of course arguable that evidence about a person's religious beliefs would be relevant to
the issue of morals and thus that using purely secular means in this context would not completely suffice. To avoid unduly infringing on the nonreligious parent's constitutional rights,
the court would need to require a factual showing that the particular religion embodies the
secular values with which the court is concerned. Although this approach might avoid the
problem of using religious means when secular ones would suffice, it creates its own insurmountable problems. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
55. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 784-85 n.39 (1973).
56. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) ("Frequently the most probative
evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor."); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973) ("a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true intent"); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (''we do not hold that Sunday
legislation may not violate the Establishment Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose
- evidenced either on the face of the legislation, . . . or in its operative effect - is to use the
State's coercive power to aid religion") (emphasis added).
57. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 n.39 (1973) (emphasis
added). In Nyquist, appellees argued that the Court had to decide whether the tuition grant
program in question for nonpublic school pupils had the "primary" effect of subsidizing religion or of promoting legitimate secular objectives. The Court held that it was neither possible
nor necessary to make such a "metaphysical judgment," yet it struck down the tuition grant
under the establishment clause. The Court stated that even if it were able to balance finely
enough to determine whether the secular benefits outweighed the sectarian ones, it could not
uphold such "a direct and substantial advancement of religion." 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 n.39; see
also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,366 (1975) (striking down a statutory provision for aid to
Pennsylvania private schools, as it "inescapably results in the direct and substantial advance-
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the standard, choosing a custodian even partially because of his religiousness impermissibly advances religion.
Basing custody decisions on religion principally and primarily
advances religion by violating the neutrality principle58 of the first
amendment and putting the authority, influence, official support and
coercive power of the state behind religion. 59 As the Alaska
Supreme Court stated in Bonjour v. Bonjour, 60 "[t]he principal or primary effect of giving preference to parents who are members of an
'organized religious community' in child custody disputes will be to
encourage nonreligious, anti-religious, or simply disinterested parents to engage in religious practices even if their beliefs are not sincere." The court concluded that the practice "goes beyond
accommodation and benevolent neutrality towards religion." 61 This
ment of religious activity"); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,683 (1971) (prohibiting federal
funding of sectarian school buildings with only a twenty-year restriction on the religious use of
the facilities, for the funding might "in part have the effect of advancing religion." But see
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). In Mueller the Court upheld a tax statute allowing all
parents with elementary and secondary school-age children to deduct expenses for transportation, textbooks and tuition. It is too early to tell if Mueller substantially undercut the strict
prohibition against benefits to religion found in Nyquist, Meek and Tilton. The Court did not
denounce any of the previous cases. Instead, it distinguished the statute in question by emphasizing its facial neutrality - i.e., the fact that the deduction on its face was available to all
parents, "including those whose children attend[ed] public schools." 103 S. Ct. at 3068. Providing benefits to a broad spectrum of groups is an indicator of secular effect. 103 S. Ct. at
3068. The Court also recognized that "traditionally '[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes' . . . ." 103 S. Ct. at 3067 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (1983)), and noted that this
deduction was "only one among many." 103 S. Ct. at 3067. It praised the contributions made
by private schools. "[W]hatever unequal effect may be attributed to the statutory classification
can fairly be regarded as a rough return for the benefits . . . provided to the state and all
taxpayers by parents sending their children to parochial schools." 103 S. Ct. at 3070. It appears unlikely that Mueller applies to the present context. Custody preferences for religious
parents are not facially neutral, they are not tax classifications and they do not benefit all
taxpayers or the state.
58. See note 6 supra for a discussion of the principle of neutrality.
59. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979) ("In short, it puts government on the side of organized religion, a non-secular result that the establishment clause is
designed to prevent."); In re Adoption of"E", 59 N.J. 36, 58,279 A.2d 785, 797 (1971) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) ("Whether the price of the heresy is the destruction of a man's good
character or merely a blot upon it, it is equally true that the State stamps its approval upon
some tenets and its disapproval upon others. This is precisely what the First Amendment forbids."). For evidence that judicial preferences for religious parents amount to the state coercing people into professing religious beliefs, see note 61 iefra and accompanying text.
60. 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979).
61. 592 P.2d at 1243. Other courts and commentators have also recognized that people will
alter their religious behavior or at least lie about it in response to coercive pressure by the court
awarding custody. For example, in People ex rel McGrath v. Gimler, 60 N.Y.S.2d 622, 627
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), q/fd mem., 270 A.D. 949, 62 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1946), the custody battle
involved parents who had baptized their child as a Catholic. When the parents separated, the
mother, a Lutheran, began to bring the child up in her own religion. The father claimed he
would raise the child a Catholic. In the midst of the custody hearing "the child was, more or
less hurriedly, introduced [by her mother] to the Catholic pastor in the neighborhood, entered
in the parochial school there, and began to receive religious instruction." 60 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
The judge expressed his belief that the mother's knowledge that the court would want the child
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direct state support of religion is precisely what the establishment
clause forbids. 62
raised in the religion into which she had been baptised had played a part in the mother's
decision to change the child's religious focus to Catholicism. See also Ex parte Agnello, 72
N.Y.S.2d 186, 190-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) ("The stepmother, in an evident attempt to
strengthen [the father's] application for custody, proclaimed that she is a devout Roman Catholic, is bringing up her own children in that faith, and would do all in her power to foster
Alphonse's present desire to enter the priesthood."); H. CLARK, supra note 40, at 589 ("A '
reading of the cases leads to the conclusion that too many courts require lip service to a particular religious faith and a showing of some essentially meaningless religious observances as the
price of obtaining custody.").
The issue of state coercion in promoting religion has arisen in the analogous setting of
adoption proceedings. In response to a proposal that children up for adoption be given only to
families that are religiously affiliated, Rabbi Duker asked, "Who are we to decide that persons
who cannot become parents . . . should be forced to lie or pretend . . . in order to obtain the
child?" Breeder & Barrett, supra note 36, at 668 (quoting Rabbi Duker). In instances when a
mother wants her child to be adopted by people of a different religion and the state has a
religious matching requirement, "it has often been suggested that the mother may change her
own religion, or change her child's religion before the adoption petition is introduced" to insure that the adoption will not be denied. Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion lo an
Iefanl in Adoption Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 649, 661 (1959). What often happens in
adoption situations is that potential "adoptive parents . . . may misrepresent their religious
affiliations . . . ; in fact they may even be encouraged to do so." Comment, supra note 30, at
807. One agency noted, "[m]any people start going to church before they apply in order to
'qualify' but after the adoption is decreed who knows what happens?" Id. at 807 n.132.
Another coercive situation arises when judges and probation officers, believing that children need religion, insist that delinquent children attend church, sign up for release-time programs in their schools or write the Ten Commandments. See A. KAHN, supra note 38, at 109.
Judges "who introduce the religious issue without considering its helpfulness or propriety in
the given case or the wishes of the family are engaged in questionable coercion as they seek to
'use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person.'" Id. at 111 (quoting
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
62. In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 58, 279 A.2d 785, 797 (1971) (Weintraub, C.J.,
concurring). See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The establishment clause is particularly opposed to state authority and support for religion that rises to the level of coercion. This is true
even if one is only forced to profess some belief that one does not hold. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961) (striking down a Maryland statute requiring people holding
"offices of profit or trust" to declare their belief in the existence of God and stating that the
state could not limit "public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess lo
have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept") (emphasis added); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (The government may not "force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion."). Though a coercive purpose or effect is not necessary to establish
a violation of the establishment clause, it is sufficient. See Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452-53 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,314 (1952);
Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,217 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Comment, supra note 30, at 814 n.174.
But see Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). Here the Court upheld the Nebraska
legislature's practice of beginning each legislative session with a prayer. While there is an
element of coercion here, the violation in no way involved children, for whom the Court has
shown particular concern. See note 65 i'!fra. Additionally, there is much less coercion placed
on legislators by a prayer than there is on a parent who wants custody of his child and must
attend church to get it.
Preferring religious parents in child custody cases puts the power and prestige of the government behind religion and applies "indirect coercive pressure" on prospective custodians to
conform to the judge's religious requirements. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text;
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A judicial preference for religious parents also fails the second
part of the Lemon test by directly and immediately advancing religion. While the practice couldhave the effect of aiding moral development in children, this secular effect is speculative. In contrast, the
sectarian effect is direct and immediate. Thus, even if it were proved
that the moral development was a primary effect, "a court would still
be unlikely to classify the unquestionable aid to religion that these
statutes provide as incidental." 63
Allowing religion to be a factor in custody disputes also advances
religion in other ways. First, court preferences for religion punish
people for not believing in God or going to church by making it less
likely that such parents will gain custody of their children. 64 Second,
preferring religion could increase the number of children raised in
religious households. This certainly would have the effect of advancing religion. 65 Courts favoring religious parents in their custody
decisions thus fail the second part of the Lemon test. They make the
cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) ("The First Amendment was added to the Consti•
tution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Govern•
ment would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people
can say . . . ."). The state cannot successfully defend this coercion by pointing out that the
parent is not compelled to try to gain custody. The Supreme Court has already rejected a
similar argument in a religious discrimination case. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495-96 (1961) ("The fact ... that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possi•
bly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the
Constitution.").
63. Note, Religious Matching Statutes and Adoption, supra note 36, at 271-72. The situation
is parallel to religious matching in adoption, where a child is assigned a religion and matched
to the religion of prospective adoptive parents. Id. at 269-72. When the court begins by
presuming that religious people are good people, and religious homes are good homes, the
conclusion that a religious person is a fit custodian follows too easily. Conversely, a nonreli•
gious person will have a barrier to hurdle to convince the judge that she is a moral enough
person to raise a child. The dangers are even more apparent when the judge considers "spiritual well-being" to be an element of the best interest equation. See note 29 supra.
64. Cf. Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517 (Ct. App. 1967) ("Deprivation of the custody of a child is not a 'slender' ... punishment: it is a heavy penalty to pay for the exercise
of a religious belief . . . .").
65. Some commentators have observed that religious matching in adoption cases has the
effect of advancing religion. See Note, Religious Matching Statutes, supra note 36, at 271 ("By
imputing a religion to a child who might otherwise be brought up without religion ... religious matching laws effectively gain recruits for various religious denominations."); see also
Comment, supra note 30, at 813.
Research suggests that once children are placed in a religious home, they are more likely to
become religious themselves. Parental religiosity and support for religion are good predictors
of the religiosity of the child. See Nelsen, Religious Transmission Versus Religious Formation:
Preadolescent-Parent Interaction, 21 Soc. Q. 207 (1980); Hunsberger, supra note 38, at 168.
The Supreme Court has expressed particular concern over establishment clause violations
that affect children, as they are seen as impressionable and thus more susceptible to religious
indoctrination. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298-99
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335-36 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 764 (1976); Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,227 (1948).
These opinions suggest that court attempts to place children in religious rather than nonreligious homes are particularly suspect.
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government a "sponsor" of religion, which is one of the three main
evils the establishment clause was designed to prevent. 66
C.

Preferring the Religious Parent Impermissibly Entangles the
State in Religious Affairs

The entanglement aspect of the Lemon test is designed to prevent
excessive governmental involvement with religion. 67 It keeps the
"state from interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life,
either by taking upon itself the decision of religious issues or by unduly involving itself in the supervision of religious institutions or officials."68 To keep the state out of religious affairs, the test forbids
the state from supervising and surveying religion on a continuing
basis.69 The entanglement test is particularly concerned with eliminating long-term relationships between the state and religion.70
Courts consider custody judgments to be temporary and subject
to change when conditions and circumstances warrant it.71 Fre66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally note 6 supra.
61. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (1971);
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). The test is one of degree, as some involvement
and entanglement are inevitable. See notes 129-32 iefra and accompanying text.
68. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3342 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
69. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971), the Supreme Court invalidated a
Rhode Island statute providing state aid to religious schools for teachers' salaries. The Court
found that a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" would inevitably be required to insure that the teachers receiving aid teach only courses offered in public
schools with the same textbooks. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court struck
down an Ohio statutory provision for public fund expenditures for such "field trip transportation and services to nonpublic school students as are provided to public school students in the
district." 433 U.S. at 252 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code. Ann.§ 3317.06). The Court argued that
the provision would create an excessive entanglement since "public school authorities will be
unable adequately to insure secular use of the field trip funds without close supervision of the
nonpublic teachers." 433 U.S. at 254. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975), the
Court struck down a Pennsylvania law providing "auxiliary services" to private school children. These services included remedial instruction and guidance counseling. The Court, citing Lemon, found that an "excessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to be
'certain,' as it must be, that Act 194 personnel do not advance the religious mission of the
church-related schools in which they serve."
70. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1971), the Court emphasized that the
statutory aid to religious schools for the salaries of those teaching secular material was in the
form of continuing cash subsidies. These subsidies were accompanied by governmental control
and surveillance, creating an "intimate and continuing relationship between church and state."
The Court distinguished statutes subsidizing teachers' salaries from those allowing loans of
secular books to private schools on the ground that books, unlike teachers, could be inspected
just once. 403 U.S. at 619. The Court upheld governmental aid to colleges in the form of a
single purpose, one-time construction grant in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
"There are no continuing financial relationships . . . no annual audits, and no governmental
analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities."
403 U.S. at 688. The government's retention of the right to inspect the buildings did not affect
the Court's entanglement analysis. See note 130 iefra.
71. See Fears v. Fears, 5 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 283 N.E.2d 704, 710 (1972); Goodman v.
Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 89, 141 N.W.2d 445, 449 (1966); Co=onwealth ex rel Bordlemay v.
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quently the trial court retains jurisdiction over custody after making
a judgment and orders modifications that it deems necessary. 72 The
general standard required for modification is proof of substantially
changed circumstances affecting the child's best interest.73 The noncustodial parent is free to initiate reevaluation of the decision and
attempt to prove changed circumstances. As a result, the "parent
who has custody must lead his or her life under the watchful eye of
the court, constantly fearing judicial intervention."74
Courts have considered religion in a number of custody modification cases. For example, one court's list of "serious changes" justifying a change of custody included the fact that the children had not
been taken to church and were being deprived of religious training. 75
Bordlemay, 31 D. & C.2d 46, 51, qffd, 201 Pa. Super. 435, 193 A.2d 845,848 (1963); Munoz v.
Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 815, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1971).
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 191, 367 P.2d 230, 231 (1961) ("(C]ontinuing
jurisdiction to amend, change, or alter the provisions of a decree relating to the custody of
minor children is expressly recognized by statute"); Staggs v. Staggs, 250 Iowa 936, 941, 96
N.W.2d 736, 739 (1959); Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. I, 8, 309 P.2d 705, 711 (1957); Daubert
v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 310, 211 A.2d 323, 327 (1965).
73. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Hames, 159 Ga. App. 552,553,284 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1981); Fears
v. Fears, 5 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 282 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1972); Henderson v. Henderson, 622
S.W.2d 7, 8-9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); In re Custody of Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 646, 290 S.E.2d 664,
668 (1980); Salvaggio v. Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 879 (1952).
74. Co=ent, supra note 45, at 750 n.107. The Comment argues that this "temporary
nature of custody orders ... encourages abuse of judicial discretion by making the orders
subject to constant review and keeping parents ..• under indefinite judicial scrutiny." Id. at
750. It suggests that custody orders should be made permanent to protect the custodial parent
from this indefinite scrutiny. Id at 753.
A parent generally need not become unfit to lose custody of the child. See, e.g., Salvaggio v.
Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Usually all the court need do is decide
that substantially changed circumstances indicate that a switch in custody is necessary to serve
the child's best interest. See Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill. App. 3d 16, 19, 167 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1960);
note 73 supra and accompanying text. While the noncustodial parent is usually the one requesting a change in custody, in at least one state the court may alter the custody decree on its
own motion. See Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 141 N.W.2d 445 (1966).
75. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 395 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). A number of other
courts have considered religion in custody modification cases. Some of these decisions refuse
to order a change in custody, relying in part on the custodian's religiousness or provision of
religious training to the child. See, e.g., Reaves v. Reaves, 399 So. 2d 311,312 (Ala. Civ. App.
1981) (denying change from father to mother); McCullough v. McCullough, 222 Ark. 390,394,
260 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1953) (denying change from mother to father); Graves v. French, 209
Ark. 564, 568, 191 S.W.2d 590, 591 (1946) (denying change from grandparents to mother);
Wellcome v. Wilk, 339 Ill. App. 444, 447, 90 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1950) (denying an appeal from
a custody modification order); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1392-95, 140 N.W.2d 152,
154-55 (1966) (denying change from grandparents to father); Lemoine v. Lemoine, 393 So. 2d
251,252 (1980), writ refd, 395 So. 2d 1354 (La. 1981) (denying change from father to mother);
Robertson v. Robertson, 243 So. 2d 847, 848 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (denying change from aunt to
mother); Dansker v. Dansker, 279 S.W.2d 205, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (denying change from
welfare home, which provided religious opportunities, to the father); Anderson v. Anderson,
145 Mont. 244, 248, 400 P. 2d 632, 634 (1965) (denying change from father to mother);
Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 363, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974) (denying change from
mother to father); Co=onwealth ex rel Bendnick v. White, 403 Pa. 55, 62, 169 A.2d 69, 73
(1961) (denying change from a couple unrelated to the child to the father); Commonwealth ex
rel Bordlemay v. Bordlemay, 31 D.&C.2d 46, 51, qffd, 201 Pa. Super. 435, 193 A.2d 845, 848-
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Courts that consider religion in change of custody cases are in essence supervising religion. They are allowing the religious practices
of both parents and children to be a continuing subject of judicial
inquiry and ground for court intervention should the judge disapprove of the current situation. This is an enduring and supervisory
relationship between courts and religion amounting to an excessive
entanglement.76
A different type of entanglement prohibited by the establishment
clause is state involvement in purely religious disputes. The first
amendment requires the state to stay out of controversies over reli49 (1963) (denying change from father to mother); Mathews v. Mathews, 273 S.C. 130, 132, 254
S.E.2d 801, 802 (1979) (denying appeal from divorce decree giving custody); cf Whalen v.
Boles, 314 Ky. 817,819,236 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951) (stating in granting change
from grandmother to father that all parties were fit to have custody, in part because all attended church regularly). In other cases, courts have considered the custodian's lack of religious observance or failure to provide the child with religious training in ordering a change in
custody. See, e.g., Allison v. Ovens, 4 Ariz. App. 496, 421 P.2d 929, 935 (1966), vacated in part
on other grounds, 102 Ariz. 520, 433 P.2d 968 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Murphy
v. Murphy, 143 Conn. 600, 603, 124 A.2d 891, 893 (1956); Staggs v. Staggs, 250 Iowa 938, 94546, 96 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (1959) (ordering change of custody to the father, despite the fact
that the mother had regularly taken the children to Sunday school; speculating that the
mother's new baby would make future Sunday school attendance difficult, and noting that the
religious atmosphere of the father's home was "of a very high standard"); Camelo v. Camelo,
402 So. 2d 174, 175 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 92-93,
447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1982); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232
S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1977); Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wash. 2d 409, 415-16, 287 P.2d 1001,
1005 (1955); see also Anhalt v. Fesler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, 923, 636 P.2d 224, 226 (1981)
(religion and church attendance may be considered although they are not alone sufficient to
warrant a change in custody); cf Wood v. Wood, 461 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970)
(considering religiousness in ordering a change in custody).
Some courts refuse to consider religion in a change of custody case, holding that the custodial parent has the right to control the child's religious education once custody has been
awarded. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 89, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501, 513
(1971); Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 96, 97 A.2d 419,422 (Ch. Div. 1953); People ex
rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 544, 104 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1952); Pfeffer, supra note 13, at
356-58 (arguing that both the Constitution and judicial policy demand that the custodial parent be allowed to decide on the religious upbringing of the child).
16. See Broeder & Barrett, supra note 36, at 668-69 (quoting Rabbi Duker):
Should adoptive parents be forced to submit to a continuous process of religious testing to
see whether the home is sufficiently religious? . . . How do we assess the religious content
of a home? . . .
Carried to their logical conclusion, religious tests would involve continuous inspection
of households by religious functionaries . . . . Shall clergymen of the various faiths become officially part of the state adoption apparatus?
See also Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 359 ("When the purpose of state intervention and supervision
is to control religious upbringing . . . it violates . . . the independence of church and state.").
The dangers of this supervision and surveillance of religion would be particularly acute if
the court were to attempt to make a factual showing that a particular religion or congregation
taught certain moral values. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text. In such a case, the
court would have no choice but to survey the religious organization to which the parent belonged. This prospect conjures up images of judges sitting in the back of churches, observing
the service. This is exactly what the Supreme Court has made clear it most wants to avoid.
See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text. The potentially long-term nature of child custody disputes makes it unlikely that this would be a one-time event, thus increasing the degree
of entanglement. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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gious doctrine and polity77 to ensure governmental neutrality in
these matters.78 This principle that the judiciary should not interfere
in essentially religious disputes has led numerous state courts to refuse to enforce agreements between divorced or separated parents on
the religious upbringing of the children.79 It also has led many
judges deciding custody cases to refuse to evaluate the relative merits
of different religious beliefs. so These judges realize that deciding
which parent's religion is better for the child unduly entangles them
in a religious dispute. There is no constitutional difference between
deciding that one faith is better than another and deciding that faith
is better than no faith. 81 In both cases, the judge is evaluating the
relative merits of the parents' sentiments on religious matters. This
77. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
78. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J,,
concurring).
79. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 n.9 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Two central concerns, both implicating the entanglement aspect of the
Lemon test, have led many courts to refuse to enforce these agreements. One problem is that
enforcement entangles civil courts in disputes over the merits of various religions. See Hackett
v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431,436,438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) ("American governmental aloofness
from ecclesiastical disputes would seem to foreclose judicial consideration of this argument
. . . .") (citation omitted); see also McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 274, 132 A,2d
420 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1959) (refusing to change custody because of violations of an antenuptial agreement about religious training for the children or to order its specific performance);
Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289,293 (1957) (disregarding the parents' contract
relating to the religious training of their children); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78
N.W.2d 491 (1956) (refusing to hold a mother in contempt for violating a custody decree that
she would raise the child as a Roman Catholic and stating that enforcement of the contract
would be unconstitutional, as it would amount to the court coercing a person to adhere to a
religious faith); Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685,692 (1910) (refusing specific
enforcement of a prenuptial agreement on religious training).
The other difficulty with court enforcement of such decrees or agreements is that it entangles the court with religion by requiring it to supervise the child's religious training continually. Courts should not attempt to control the child's religious upbringing after a custody
order, for state intervention and supervision to control religious upbringing violates the independence of church and state. See Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 358-59. In Hackel/ v. Hackel/, the
court noted that observance of religious doctrine is a matter of "personal choice uncontrolled
by law . . . . Nor can the free choice of religious practices be circumscribed or controlled by
contract." 150 N.E.2d at 433. The court also stated that policing the agreement to raise the
child as a Catholic would raise problems of separating church and state. This agreement differed from ones concerning matters "of a secular nature only . . . here we are dealing with
matters of a religious nature only, which . . . are beyond the jurisdiction of the court to enforce by contempt proceedings or otherwise." 150 N.E.2d at 440.
80. See note 20 supra and accompanying text; see also Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 451 A.2d 374 (1982); Hehman v.
Rehman, 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Commonwealth ex rel
Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. 403,205 A.2d 49, 51 (1964).
81. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Some courts realize that preferences for
religion in general are just as impermissible as denominational preferences. See, e.g., Welker
v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1964) (refusing to evaluate the comparative
merits of religious attitudes in a custody contest between a religious parent and an agnostic);
see also Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 503, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Blonsky v. Blonsky, 84 Ill. App. 3d 810, 816,405 N.E.2d
1112, 1116-17 (1980) (quoting the trial judge: "I clearly don't have an ability to determine
which faith is better or if any faith is better.").
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type of decision takes judges "too far down the path of religious philosophy . . . thereby entangling them in debates particularly inappropriate to the judicial function." 82
Courts thus encounter serious constitutional problems by considering religion in custody cases when there is no showing that the
child has personal religious convictions. The preference for religious
over nonreligious parents violates all three elements of the Lemon
test: it serves a religious rather than a secular purpose, it has the
primary effect of advancing religion and it impermissibly entangles
the state with religion. Given that religion may not constitutionally
be a factor in these cases, judges should not even inquire into religious practices or beliefs. 83 Such questioning raises the danger that
the trial judge will be unconciously affected by religion in reaching
her decision without this being apparent to the appellate court. 84 The
impermissibility of judges inquiring into religion and considering it
in their custody decisions changes, however, when a minor has personal convictions about religion.
IL

CONSIDERING RELIGION WHEN A MINOR HAS SINCERE
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS

Many state statutes include a mature child's wishes as a factor in
the determination of the child's best interest in custody disputes. 85
82. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979).
83. See generally Comment, supra note 45, at 753 (suggesting that no evidence that relates
to a parent's "exercise of a constitutional right" should be admitted "absent a clear showing
that such evidence has a direct bearing upon the welfare of the child"). When the child fails to
express a custody preference based on religion, there is no such "clear showing" to allow the
admission of evidence on religion. Cf. note 104 iefra.
84. A number of factors indicate the importance of not asking questions about religion
when there is no showing that religion is relevant. These factors include the difficulty the
judge may face in remaining religiously neutral, see note 45 supra, the broad discretfon afforded the trial judge and the loose standard of appellate review. The broad discretion of the
trial judge may mean that constitutional violations do not appear in the record. See Zazoway,
Religious Upbringing of Children ofter .Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 160, 165 (1980) ("[S]ince
the trial judge's decision will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse, a judge might
draft his custody order to promote one belief over another and hide his motivation within the
wide discretion afforded him by the imprecision of the 'best interest' standard."). Pfeffer has
made a similar observation:
A judge passing upon custody applicants has so large a degree of discretion, and the
factors that may properly be considered are so numerous and variegated that he can generally give effect to his own religious predispositions without even mentioning religion,
and can do so without much risk of appellate reversal.
Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 366. Even if the constitutional violation appears on the record, the
broad discretion afforded the trial judge makes it unlikely that a reviewing court will closely
scrutinize the record for constitutional or statutory violations. See J. McCAHEY, M. KAUFMAN
& C. KRAUT, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW PRACTICE§ 26.06 (1983) (Since the decision is largely within the trial judge's discretion, "the appellate court places strong reliance
upon the trial judge's determination of what course of action will be in the best interests of the
children.").
85. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1277.1 (West 1983).
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Other statutes allow children age fourteen or older to choose their
custodian unless the court determines that this would be contrary to
their best interest. 86 With or without specific statutory authorization,
courts frequently abide by the custody preferences of minors who are
of "sufficient mental maturity intelligently and rationally to formulate them." 87
While courts will carefully consider children's preferences, they
are not binding on the court88 in the absence of any contrary statutory provision. The judge is generally free to find that the child's
expressed wish is not in his best interest. Courts usually evaluate the
child's expressed preference in light of factors such as the child's age,
intelligence, maturity and freedom to make his own decision. 89 The
trial judge determines the weight to be given to the child's preference
from this evaluation. 90 Although judges tend to give more weight to
the custody preferences of older children, 91 they will consider the
preferences of younger children found to be mature and intelligent. 92
When a mature minor expresses a preference to live with one
parent over the other because of the child's desire to practice or not
to practice a religion, 93 the court may consider religion in determin86. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 30-127 (1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon
1975).
87. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 29 N.J. Super. 317,326, 102 A.2d 656,662 (19S4); see also note 103
infra and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., McCullogh v. McCullogh, 222 Ark. 390,260 S.W.2d 463 (1953) (not heeding
preference of IS-year-old); Co=onwealth ex rel Shamenek v. Allen, 179 Pa. Super. 169, 116
A.2d 336, 339 (1955) (children's expressed wishes are not controlling though they should be
carefully considered); Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CoNTEMP,
PROBS. 721, 729 (1944) ("Welfare controls choice and the court will not permit the choice of
the child to lead to an improper custody.").
89. See, e.g., Fohr v. Fohr, 75 Ill. App. 3d S75, S79, 394 N.E.2d 87, 90 (1979) ("Before a
judge can properly weigh an election he must satisfy himself that the child is making it while
possessed of the understanding that his age, intelligence, knowledge and experience will permit
him to assimilate."); Pozzo v. Pozzo, 113 N.H. 436, 437, 309 A.2d IS I, 153 (1973) (The desires
of the child "should be given more or less weight depending upon the age of the child and his
ability to form an intelligent judgment."); Commonwealth ex rel Stevens v. Shannon, 107 Pa.
Super. 557, 164 A. 352, 354 (1933) ("Even the preference expressed by a child must be based
on good reasons, and the child's maturity and intelligence must be considered.").
90. Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword· Current Considerations in Cliild Cus•
tody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683, 689 (1977). The deciding factor is still the child's best
interest. See Knoblauch v. Jones, 613 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (The court must
evaluate the basis for the child's wishes so it can "properly place this element in its proper
perspective in deciding what is in the best interest of the child."),
91. See Quinn v. Franzman, 451 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing 13-yearold to nominate his guardian); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 799, 451 A.2d 374, 378
(1982) (14-year-old's preference will usually be crucial); Co=onwealth ex rel Baisden v.
DeMarco, 215 Pa. Super. 38, 257 A.2d 365 (1969) (preference of 8-year-old not controlling).
92. See, e.g., Wellcome v. Wilk, 339 Ill. App. 444, 90 N.E.2d 260 (1950) (I I-year-old);
Bankert v. Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973) (IO-year-old). There is
usually no fixed age at which the child is given discretion to choose. ''The proper test is mental
capacity." Weinman, supra note 88, at 729.
93. Since the establishment clause bars the government from preferring religion to nonreligion, see notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text, a child's desire to avoid religion should be
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ing custody.94 The court's use of religion, however, should be limited in a number of respects. First, the court should only consider
religion when the child has actually expressed a religion-based custody preference. It is essential that the court not impute this preference to the child by deciding that the child "needs religion." 95 The
court must also treat custody preferences based on religion in the
same way it treats those based on irreligion. 96
Once the child has expressed a religion-based custody preference,
the court should not defer to it any more than it would to a preference based on other relevant factors. 97 This means that the court is
generally free to find that the preference is not in the child's best
interest.98 It also means that the court should weigh the religionregarded as a "religious decision" and should be treated like a child's preference for religion in
general or for a specific religion.
94. The establishment clause analysis in Part II is based on constitutionalpermissivenessi.e., it concludes that a court may rely on the religious needs of a mature child when the child
has expressed a religion-based custody preference. To the extent that minors have a right to
the free exercise of their religion, this too would be implicated in such situations. An analysis
under the free exercise clause would discuss a constitutional mandate - i.e., whether a court
must facilitate a mature child's practice of her religion. See Mangrum, supra note 6, at 58-59.
For a discussion of children's free exercise rights or the lack thereof, see id; Pfeffer, supra note
13, at 354-56; Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
160, 171-73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Religious Upbringing]; Note, Adjudicating what
Yoder Lefl Unresolved· Religious Rights for Minor Children ofter Danforth and Carey, 126 U.
PA. L. R.E.v. 1135 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, What Yoder Lefl Unresolvedj.
95. A "presumption that a child 'needs religion' " that is not based on desires expressed by
the child "converts [a] secular ... purpose into a judicial preference for religion." Bonjour v.
Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1242 (Alaska 1979). Instead of neutrally facilitating a child's preference, the court is advancing its own preference for religion. This moves the state away from
neutrality into a position of sponsorship. See note 6 supra.
The constitutionality of state statutes instructing the court to consider the child's religious
needs or continuation of the child's religious education in custody disputes, see note 4 supra,
thus depends on how these statutes are interpreted and applied. None of these statutes say
whether the court, the parent or the child is the one to decide whether there are religious needs
in the first place. If they are used to impute religious needs to a child, they are unconstitutional. If they are interpreted to allow consideration of religion only when the child has expressed an actual preference, they are constitutional. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d at
1233 (using this analysis to find the Alaska statute constitutional on its face).
96. A child's aversion to religious training must be considered. See Bonjour v. Bonjour,
592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979) (Courts resolving custody disputes may consider "the expressed preference of a child mature enough to make a choice between a form of religion or
the lack of it."); see also note 93 supra and accompanying text.
97. The court's task in custody cases is to determine the best interest of the child. See notes
1-5 supra and accompanying text. Courts should consider religion because, presumably, respecting the child's reasonable preferences serves the child's best interest. Whether or not the
child's preference is based on religion, the inquiry remains the same - what is best for the
child. If courts allow a religious preference to control their decision when they would not have
allowed the child's preference based on other factors to do so, they are sponsoring religion
rather than neutrally factoring the child's preference into the best interest equation. The first
amendment's requirement of governmental neutrality toward religion will only be satisfied if
courts treat religion-based preferences as they treat preferences based on other relevant
considerations.
98. See Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 141 N.W.2d 445 (1966) (awarding custody of
11- and 14-year-old children to their father despite their expressed preference for their mother
and her religion, finding that this was in the children's best interest). List explains that "where
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based choice according to the child's maturity, sincerity, capacity
and freedom to choose and express that choice. 99 As with custody
preferences in general, courts tend to give more weight to the wishes
of older children, 100 but will consider the desires of younger children
when the circumstances warrant it. 101 In some cases the judge has
refused to take a child's religious views into account, believing them
the child is old enough to have developed an interest in and a preference for a particular
religion, the courts are reluctant to choose custodians of a different religion • • . . [T]hese
cases depend upon the age of the child. But no substantial sacrifice of a child's purely tempo•
ral interests will be made in order to insure that it receives training in any particular religion."
List, supra note 14, at 16. The judge may and should disregard a child's religion-based custody
preference that threatens her temporal health or safety. See notes 14-17, 19 supra and accom•
panying text.
99. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 n.14 (Alaska 1979); cf. Curtis v. Curtis, 71
Mass. (5 Gray) 535, 557 (1955) (16-year-old's "maturity of mind and capacity to judge" con•
sidered in allowing her to live with the Shakers over her mother's objections).
100. See Curtis v. Curtis, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 535 (1855) (allowing 16-year-old to choose to
live with the Shakers over her mother's objection); Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d
812 (1954) (following the preference ofa 12-year-old); Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc. 2d 318,
178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (although believing the 13-year-old child should be
raised a Catholic, the court made its determination subject to the child's wishes); Booke v.
Booke, 207 Misc. 999, 1001, 141 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), mod on ot/1er
grounds, l A.D.2d 782, 147 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 956) (recognizing the preference ofa
15-year-old); Ex parte Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (13-year-olds);
In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 18, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 361 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936) (giving
weight to preferences of 15- and 13-year-olds, but not 9- and 5-year-olds); Reynolds v. Rayborn, I 16 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (taking into consideration preferences of 12-yearold). According to List, supra note 14, at 26 n.83, it is "quite common in New York" to respect
the custody desires of children who have "reached the age of discretion [usually twelve to
fourteen]." See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed at note 50 supra.
In Yoder, the Supreme Court did not resolve the question of what rights Amish children want•
ing to attend school after age 14 would have against their parents. Justice Douglas, dissenting
in part, argued that the Court should have answered this question. In his view, 14-year-old
children have the capacity to make free exercise decisions. ''There is substantial agreement
among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14·
year-old approaches that of the adult." 406 U.S. at 245 n.3; see also Note, What Yoder Left
Unresolved, supra note 93, at l 155 n. IOI (''There is now considerable evidence to the effect that
adolescents possess the intellectual capacity necessary for the meaningful exercise of first
amendment religious rights.").
For cases finding the child to be too young to form an opinion on religion, see Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 104 A.2d 898 (Conn. 1954) (placing an 8-year-old in a religious
school would not prevent her from making her own choice of religion when she reached the
age of discretion); Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (1958) (7•,
5-, and 3-year-olds too immature to have opinions on religion); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 79 A.D.
2049, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 901 (1980) (giving "little or no weight" to the preference of a 6-yearold to live with his mother who was not raising him as an Orthodox Jew, contrary to a separation agreement); Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 871, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997
(Sup. Ct. 1976) (IO-year-old too young "to suffer the imposition of a choice of religion.");
Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810,814,489 P.2d 1133, l 135 (1971) (according to trial court, 6year-old too young to make religious decision, but would be able to make own determination
at 12 or 13).
101. See Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 103, 97 A.2d 419, 426 (1953) (considering
the preference of a 9-year-old, as she was "a bright girl, far above average in intelligence and
insight"); In re McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 23-24, 112 N.Y.S. 590, 591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908) (giving considerable weight to the testimony of a IO-year-old who was "of intelligence sufficient
. . . to comprehend the nature of an oath" and who expressed "a desire to continue in the
church of his father'').
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to be a product of one parent's coercion. 102 In most cases, however,
courts have found it appropriate to consider the religious desires of
children who are able to form a reasoned judgment. 103
The religious practices of the parents can influence how much
weight courts should give to a child's religion-based custody preference. 104 Courts should be reluctant to place the child against her
religion-based wishes when the potential custodian would actively
interfere with the child's religion or irreligion. 105 On the other hand,
102. A number of courts have indicated their concern that a parent has coerced or unduly
influenced the child expressing a religion-based custody preference. See Boerger v. Boerger,
26 N.J. Super. 90, 103, 97 A.2d 419, 426 (1953) (noting the dangers of coercion when interviewing a minor about his preferences, whether or not they are based on religion); Schwarzman v.
Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 866, 874, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (children "not
capable, competent or free enough to make such a choice at this time") (emphasis added);
Gluckstem v. Gluckstem, 31 Misc. 2d 58, 60,220 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) ("I
am convinced that plaintiff has greatly influenced this infant's thinking and present desire to
become a Christian Scientist . . . ."); cf. In re McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 24, 112 N.Y.S. 590,
591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908) Gudge emphasized that he had taken pains to examine the boy separately from any parties to the proceeding). Although finding it inapplicable to the case at
hand, the court in In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 17,289 N.Y.S. 355,361 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1936), stated the general proposition that a court could not consider "too seriously what may
reasonably be considered either as an impulsive reaction of a child or the indoctrinated words
of a child repeated without conviction at the instance of some zealous adult." See also Weinman, supra note 88, at 729 ("The court must be assured that neither parent is exerting any
influence upon the judgment of the child. . . . The judge must be certain that the child ... is
free from all undue restraint.").
103. See Note, Religious Upbringing, supra note 94, at 171; Note, What Yoder Left Unresolved, supra note 94, at 1139 n.13.
104. The court has no need to elicit any evidence on the parents' religious attitudes or
activities until it determines that the child has a sincere religious preference. See notes 83-84
supra and accompanying text. Once the child has expressed such a preference, however, evidence of the parents' religious attitudes and activities may be an important part of the best
interest equation. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the judge may question
both the child and the parents about religion. Although the judge's inquiry to the parents
should focus on their attitudes toward the child's religious choice and not on their own religious choices, as a practical matter it is quite likely that probing into the former will produce
evidence of the latter. For example, if a child who has chosen to pursue Judaism complains
that her mother, a Catholic, is forcing her to accompany her to mass, the court will need to
discover whether or not the mother actually does attend mass. Judges should always remember their purpose for eliciting this information, and should consider each parent's religion only
to evaluate the child's choice. See also note 108 i'!fra and accompanying text.
105. Parental interference can take a variety of forms. For example, a parent could be
actively hostile and attempt to prevent the child from exercising her religion. In Ex Parle
Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1947), the court refused a father's petition to change custody because the 13-year-old twins wanted to stay with their aunts. One of the twins was an
altar boy and wanted to be a priest. The father was an atheist who was openly opposed to
Catholicism. A similar problem arises for a child who wants to live in a kosher home and only
one parent will keep kosher.
A parent may also attempt to force her own religion on the child. Fettig v. Fettig, 619
S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), provides a good illustration of how this situation should be
handled. Three minors aged 18, 15, and 14, wanted to live with their father primarily because
their mother, a Jehovah's Witness, was forcing her religion on them. The court treated the
minors' religion-based preferences just as it would have treated preferences based on any other
relevant fact. The court interviewed the minors as required by statute and determined that
their preferences were entitled to great weight. In awarding the children to their father, the
judge did not unduly consider religion. He merely weighed the mother's disrespect for the
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courts should more readily allow other factors to outweigh the
child's custody preference when both parents would respect the
child's religious choice. 106 This distinction between parents who will
and will not impede a child's religious desires is based on the secular
goal of serving the child's best interest, which includes the freedom
to pursue her.religious desires. 107 Courts should always remember
that they are considering the parents' religious views only because
the child has expressed a religion-based custody preference and thus
should examine the parents' religious attitudes and practices only to
the extent necessary to determine their effects on the child. 108
A number of factors thus limit the use of religion in custody cases
even when the child has a religion-based preference. However, a
practice that allows judges to consider a religious factor, even to a
limited extent, should be analyzed under the Lemon test. 109 The test
indicates that the establishment clause permits the use of religion,
properly limited, in custody disputes.
children's religious needs as a relevant factor in determining custody. See also .Developme11/s i11
the Law: the Conslilulion and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1339 (1980):
If a child has actual rather than presumed religious needs, parental unwillingness to respect the child's preference and provide the requisite freedom for his or her pursuits may
constitutionally be included as a factor in the choice of custodian. Of course, a child's
actual aversion to religious training or activities would also constitute a "religious need"
that would permit a parent's religious beliefs to be taken into account to the extent that
the religious parent was unwilling to respect the child's agnostic preferences.
106. As in the case of a child's preference for one parent based on secular concerns, a
preference based on religious concerns can be overriden by other factors weighing in favor of
the parent the child did not choose. The fact that a parent shares a child's religious beliefs
makes it likely that the parent will respect the child's beliefs. This does not mean, however,
that a parent whose religious preferences differ from those of the child will disrespect the
child's beliefs. In determining the parents' attitudes towards the child's religion, the judge
should focus on evaluating the sincerity of the parents' respective claims that they will respect
the child's choice. The judge should not be deciding which parent's religious preferences best
coincide with those of the child.
The religion factor should play less of a role in the custody decision once the judge has
determined that the parent with differing beliefs will honor the child's religious choice. While
it is still relevant that the child chose one parent for religious reasons, the court should be
willing to override that choice when most factors indicate that the other parent would be the
better custodian.
107. See notes 112-13 infra and accompanying text.
108. Religion only becomes a factor because the child has expressed a preference for one
parent for religious reasons. Thus, the scope of the inquiry is defined by the purpose of accommodating the child's choice. The court's role is not to reward a parent's religiousness or engage in a contest of comparative devoutness, but rather to determine the child's best interest.
The court should focus on the child's ability to pick her custodian. See notes 87-89 supra and
accompanying text. The court should also examine the parents' comparative willingness to
allow the child to practice her religion. See notes 104-08 supra and accompanying text. These
factors tell the court how probative the child's religious preference is in determining her secular best interest.
109. When courts follow a child's custody choice that is based on a desire to practice her
religion, they are arguably preferring something religious. State preferences for religion
should be analyzed under the Lemon test. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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Considering Religion When the Child Has Religious Convictions
Has a Secular Purpose

Determining the child's best interest is the secular purpose of
child custody decisions. Courts generally try to accommodate the
reasonable 110 custody preference of a child, as they think this enhances the child's secular welfare. 111 Considering a child's legitimate
religion-based preference, like considering preferences based on
other factors, serves a secular purpose by promoting the child's best
interest. 112 It does so by helping to ensure that the person awarded
custody will allow the child to pursue her legitimate desires. 113
Considering religion in this context not only serves a secular purpose, but it also avoids other potential constitutional problems.
Courts eliminating religion from the best interest equation when the
child has a religion-based preference act with hostility rather than
neutrality towards religion. 114 This the establishment clause
I 10. The terms "reasonable" and "legitimate" are used in this discussion of the child's
religious choice to exclude cases where the choice threatens the child's well-being. When such
a threat exists, the judge must determine whether the best interest standard requires him to
ignore the child's preference. See notes 14-19, 98 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
112. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979) ("The primary goal of the
court in awarding custody is to further the best interests of the child, which includes respecting
the beliefs of a mature child, whether they be religious or non-religious."); CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 589 (1968); Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 355-56 (A child's religious preferences are "relevant evidence" in "ascertaining the course of action most likely to promote the
child's temporal welfare and happiness.").
113. Authorities have recognized other secular reasons for awarding custody to the chosen
parent. See, e.g., In re Vardiakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 361 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936)
("In choosing the religion of one parent rather than the other, the child is frequently either
consciously or unconsciously also choosing one parent rather than the other and is indicating
to the court in the clearest way possible with which parent he has most sympathy and the
greatest sense of security." Thus, the choice of religion by an intelligent, mature child must be
"seriously considered in determining what is best for his own welfare.").
Courts respecting a child's religious preference may believe that a change in religious
environment will be traumatic for the child, . . . or that implicit in the child's religious
desires is a preference for one home rather than another. To couch such secular considerations in religious terms only confuses the real issue - determining the placement that
will best promote the child's secular welfare.
Comment, supra note 30, at 817.
114. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979); cf. Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1983). In Widmar the Court struck down a University of Missouri regulation
that barred student groups from using generally available facilities for religious worship and
teaching on free speech grounds, and stated that an equal access policy would not violate the
establishment clause and that under the circumstances in that case "by creating a forum the
University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there." 454
U.S. at 271-72 n.10. The Court noted that the "provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect." 454 U.S. at 274: Under these circumstances,
an equal access policy would be one of "neutrality toward religion," not sponsorship. 454 U.S.
at 274 n.14 (emphasis added). The Court distinguished Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), where only religious groups had been given access to the school's
facilities, since in that situation "the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker."
454 U.S. at 271-72 n.10.
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forbids. 115
A different situation is presented by the court that decides that a
child needs religion when that child has expressed no religious
desires. Here the judge is assuming that religion is an important element in the child's life, rather than evaluating the child's announcement that religion is important to her. The judge is impermissibly
favoring religion, instead of permissibly trying to accommodate the
child's own choice. 11 6
The existence of a secular purpose, however, does not alone satisfy the Lemon test. Allowing religion to be a factor in custody decisions violates the establishment clause if its principal or primary
effect is to advance religion. When the child has a religion-based
preference, this is not the case.

B.

Considering Religion .Does Not Have the Principal or Primary
Effect ofAdvancing Religion

Laws that indirectly or incidentally benefit religion do not violate
the establishment clause. 117 While a law with a primarily secular
effect may be examined to see if it has the "direct and immediate
effect of advancing religion," a "remote and incidental" effect is not
enough to violate the establishment clause. 118 The issue is one of
degree. 119
Considering religion in custody cases when the child has a religion-based preference produces a primarily secular effect - the enhancement of the child's best interest. 120 One must ask, however, if
115. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984) ("[T]he Constitution ... affirmatively mandates acco=odation, not merely tolerance of all religions, and forbids hostility
toward any."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1946) (The first amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them."); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
103-04 (1968); Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948).
116. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1242 (Alaska 1979). When a judge considers religion because of a child's preference, she is not considering religion unnecessarily. This satisfies the requirement that the state not use religious means to achieve secular ends when purely
secular means are available. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. There simply is no
purely secular way to consider a religious preference.
111. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) ("Everson and A11en put
to rest any argument that the State may never act in such a way that has the incidental effect of
facilitating religious activity."). The Court frequently has upheld benefits to religious activity
that it considered to be incidental or indirect. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968) (secular textbooks for religious schools); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(Sunday closing laws); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (bus transportation to
religious schools).
118. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973). "[N]ot every
law that confers an 'indirect,' remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for
that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." 413 U.S. at 771.
119. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
120. See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text.
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promoting the child's secular best interest also directly or immediately advances religion. An analysis of this question suggests that it
does not.
One important factor in determining whether a practice has a
primary, as opposed to an incidental, religious effect is whether it
"confer[s] any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or
practices." 121 When a court considers religion strictly within the
context of the child's preference, it displays neutrality towards rather
than approval of religion. In such cases, the judge is trying to enhance the temporal welfare of a child who has announced that religion or nonreligion is important to her. The judge "is exercising no
value judgment nor manifesting any unneutrality between conventional religion and irreligiosity or unconventional religion." 122 The
court is thus taking care not to "substitute its own preferences, either
for or against a particular type of religious observance," but is instead "retain[ing] a strict neutrality." 123 As the state is behaving
neutrally, and not as a "sponsor," any benefit that its conduct confers
on religion is largely incidental. 124
Judges who impute religion to a child or decide that religiousness
is an attribute of a good home confer state approval on religion. 125
This approval has the effect of advancing religion, as it coerces people into being religious or at least professing to be so. 126 When the
focus is on the child, however, the judge is simply accommodating
that child's reasonable preference. 127 Laws having reasons or effects
that coincide or harmonize incidentally with religious tenets do not
121. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), discussed at note 114 supra. The Court
in Widmar found that "any religious benefits of an open forum at [the university] would be
'incidental.' " The Court emphasized the fact that "an open forum in a public university does
not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." 454 U.S. at 274.
Justice Stevens, concurring, noted that the record disclosed "no danger that the University will
appear to sponsor any particular religion." 454 U.S. at 280-81. The Court doubted that "students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place." 454 U.S. at 274 n.14.
122. Pfeffer, supra note 13, at 372. This observation was made in the analogous context of
adoption.
123. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979).
124. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
127. Arguably, an element of coercion remains. A parent may be influenced by the knowledge that the judge will consider the child's religion-based preference. Yet the state is not
coercing the parent to change or claim to have changed her religious practices, as it was in Part
I. Here the state is inquiring only into the parents' willingness to allow the child the freedom
to pursue her religious desires. It is also significant that the coercion is not the result of the
state's conferring its approval on certain religious beliefs. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, any coercion operating on the parent will not result in pressure on
the child to adopt certain religious practices, which is another constitutional peril. See note 65
supra and accompanying text. In fact, the opposite result is likely. If the coercion on the parent
affects the child at all, it would promote her religious freedom.
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violate the establishment clause. 128
Factoring religion into the best interest equation for children
with sincere religious convictions thus has a secular purpose and a
predominantly secular effect. The final and perhaps most difficult
barrier remains to be surmounted.
C.

Considering Religion .Does Not Foster an Excessive
Governmental Entanglement with Religion

Some involvement and entanglement between government and
religion are inevitable. 129 A practice is not necessarily invalid be•
cause it engenders a continuing relationship between the state and
religion, 130 or because the judge exercises some degree of supervision
over religion. "The test is inescapably one of degree," 131 as it pro•
hibits only excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 132
Allowing judges to consider religion•based custody preferences
clearly results in some entanglement between state and religion. It
permits a judge to question the child and her parents about the
child's religious preference and to factor their responses into the best
interest equation. 133 Moreover, the involvement between state and
religion could be long•term, as judges may consider the child's reli•
128. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,319 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,442
(1961); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979). Additionally, programs
designed to acco=odate a person's right to the free exercise of religion are not generally
forbidden by the establishment clause. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979)
(citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), which upheld programs releasing children
from school to go elsewhere for religious instruction). To the extent that children have an
argument based on their free exercise rights, this doctrine would also come into play. See note
94 supra.
129. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971), where the Court explained that the
objective behind the entanglement test is to prevent as much as possible the intrusion of the
state and religion into each other's precincts. "Some involvement and entanglement are inevitable," but "lines must be drawn." 403 U.S. at 625; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct.
1355, 1358 (1984) (total separation of church and state is "not possible").
130. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The Court upheld n
statute giving annual subsidies, solely for secular purposes, to private institutions of higher
learning that did not award solely seminarian or theological degrees. The Maryland Council
for Higher Education had the continuing responsibility for enforcing both eligibility provisions. The Court co=ented that "though indisputably relevant ... the annual nature of the
aid cannot be dispositive." 426 U.S. at 766. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, (1971), the
Court suggested that de minimus contact does not violate the establishment clause. The Court
upheld government aid to colleges in the form of a one-time construction grant. The government, however, retained the right to inspect the subsidized buildings to insure they were not
being used for sectarian purposes. "Inspection as to use is a minimal contact." 403 U.S. at 688;
see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
131. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
132. See Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); see also Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) ("There is no exact science in gauging the entanglement of
church and state. The wording of the test, which speaks of 'excessive entanglement,' itself
makes that clear. The relevant factors ... are to be considered 'cumulatively' in judging the
degree of entanglement.").
133. See note 104 supra.
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gious preference in later change of custody proceedings. 134
A number of factors suggest, however, that this degree of entanglement is not excessive. First, it is important to identify the nature
of the court's involvement with the child's religion-based custody
preference. When the child expresses this choice, the main function
of the judge is to evaluate the child's ability to make decisions in her
own best interest. 135 This inquiry tells the judge whether or not the
religion-based preference deserves great weight because, for example, it is sincere and well-reasoned. Judges permissibly promote the
secular best interest of a child by respecting her reasonable
preferences. 136
In deciding how to weigh a child's preference, a judge may consider each parent's willingness to respect the child's religious
choice. 137 This inquiry focuses on religion not to evaluate whether
the parents' religious beliefs or practices are bad or good but rather
to determine whether they are compatible with the child's wishes.
Thus, the court does not address questions of the relative merits of
religious doctrines that it is not permitted to answer. 138
Apart from cases of religions with dangerous practices, 139 the
court will not need to debate the wisdom of the child's religious preference. The court is not deciding that one religion is better for the
child than another, or that religion is better than irreligion. The
child has already made that decision for herself. The State's role is
limited to determining the ability of the child to make a reasonable
evaluation.
Judicial consideration of a child's religion-based custody preference is essentially secular. It focuses on the child's capacity to
choose and the parents' probable responses to that choice. It does
not force the court to answer questions of religious doctrine. Thus,
the practice does not excessively entangle the state with religion. 140
The Lemon test indicates that the establishment clause permits
courts to consider a child's personal and mature religious preference
in custody cases. The practice has a secular purpose and a primary
134. See, e.g., Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 141 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. 1966); Ex parte
Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); In re Vardiakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355,
361 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936). The fact that a relationship between church and state is longterm indicates that it may amount to an excessive entanglement. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. This factor alone, however, is not dispositive. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 87-92, 99-103 supra and accompanying text; see also Bonjour v. Bonjour,
592 P.2d 1233, 1240 n.14 (Alaska 1979).
136. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 49, 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 98 supra.
140. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1243-44 n.23 (Alaska 1979).
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effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Although it necessitates some state involvement with religion, it does not foster an excessive governmental entanglement.
CONCLUSION

The establishment clause generally prohibits judges from inquiring into religion during custody hearings, and from including religion in their determination of the child's best interest. Judges
favoring religious parents when the child has no religious preference
put the vast coercive power of the state behind religion. They step
outside of their role as secular officials by trying to promote spiritual
rather than temporal well-being. The establishment clause exists to
prevent such practices.
The situation differs when the child expresses a religion-based
preference for one parent. The judge now may neutrally facilitate
the child's preference for religion without unduly involving the state.
Religion becomes an issue only because the child announces that it is
important to her. The court's inquiry into religion also is limited to
evaluating the child's religious choice and the willingness of each
parent to respect that decision. Finally, the establishment clause
permits this limited use of religion because it serves the child's secular best interest.

